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Abstract
In the last two decades, many European countries allowed the sale of Over-the-
Counter (OTC) drugs outside pharmacies. This was expected to lower retail prices
through increased competition. Evidence of such price reductions is scarce. We assess
the impact of supermarket and outlet entry in the OTC drug market on OTC prices
charged by incumbent pharmacies using a difference-in-differences strategy. We use
price data on five popular OTC drugs for all retailers located in Lisbon for three distinct
points in time (2006, 2010, and 2015). Our results suggest that competitive pressure in
the market is mainly exerted by supermarkets, which charge, on average, 20% lower
prices than pharmacies. The entry of a supermarket among the main competitors of an
incumbent pharmacy is associated with an average 4 to 6% decrease in prices relative
to the control group. These price reductions are long-lasting, but fairly localized. We
find no evidence of price reductions following OTC outlet entry. Additional results from
a reduced-form entry model and a propensity score matching difference-in-differences
approach support the view that these effects are causal.
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Over-the-counter (OTC) drugs are pharmaceuticals whose purchase does not require a
prescription. They are usually not reimbursed and their pricing is free, in contrast with the
highly regulated prices of reimbursed and/or prescription-only pharmaceuticals.
During the last two decades, European countries have extensively reformed their community
pharmacy sectors. An important element of these reforms is the liberalization of OTC medicine
distribution (OECD, 2014). OTC market liberalization implies a move from a traditional
pharmacy-centered model to a multi-channel distribution model in which OTC drugs are sold
outside pharmacies, namely in supermarkets, petrol stations, and other non-pharmacy outlets.
Throughout this paper, we refer to these as non-pharmacy retailers.
The rationale for OTC market liberalization was that the entry of non-pharmacy retailers,
combined with free OTC pricing, would lower OTC drug prices via increased competition
among retailers (Lluch and Kanavos, 2010; Stargardt et al., 2007; Morgall and Almarsdóttir,
1999). Existing literature posits that pharmacies are not used to price competition and do
not place competitive constraints on each other (Pilorge, 2016; Stargardt et al., 2007).1 The
fact that, at least in urban areas, non-pharmacy retailers charge lower prices than traditional
pharmacies (Anell, 2005; OFT, 2003) might mechanically lead to lower average prices, but
provides no evidence of competitive forces. We examine whether facing increased competitive
pressure following the entry of a non-pharmacy competitor, who is able to charge lower prices,
triggers price decreases by incumbent pharmacies.
This is an important question that, to the best of our knowledge, has not yet been fully
addressed in the literature. OTC drugs are one of the few product segments for which
pharmacies can make their own pricing decisions. Because they are frequently used, we expect
consumers to be aware of price differences between retailers (Sorensen, 2000). By shedding
light on how competition takes place in this market, we contribute to inform policy-makers
on the market dynamics they might expect upon liberalizing OTC medicine distribution.
The empirical analysis draws on the Portuguese experience. In Portugal, OTC market
liberalization started in late 2005 and allowed OTC drugs to be sold outside pharmacies,
namely in supermarkets and outlets.2 OTC market liberalization reforms similar to the
Portuguese one were implemented all over Europe during the last two decades: In 2000,
1This inability may be associated with either the development of close professional relationships among
pharmacists or to their use to the non-competitive environment in place prior to market liberalization.
Alternatively, pharmacies may not compete in prices but rather in quality, range of services, location, or
opening times (Martins and Queirós, 2015; Lluch and Kanavos, 2010; Anell, 2005; Rudholm, 2008; Stargardt
et al., 2007; Schaumans and Verboven, 2008).
2Patŕıcio et al. (2005), CEGEA (2005), and Gomes (2007) used the classic frameworks of Hotelling (1929)
and Waterson (1993) to make predictions of the expected price outcomes of the reform. These predictions
pointed in very different directions and the real impact of the reform was never assessed.
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Poland allowed for a limited range of OTC products to be sold outside pharmacies; Denmark,
Norway, Italy, Hungary, Sweden, and France adopted similar policies in the following years;
Germany and the United Kingdom had already done so during the 1990s.
We use price data for five popular OTC drugs across all retailer types (traditional pharmacies,
supermarkets, and outlets) located in Lisbon. The dataset has a panel structure and each
retailer is observed for at most three points in time, the years of 2006, 2010, and 2015. In our
data, supermarkets and outlets charge, on average, 20% and 4% lower prices than traditional
pharmacies, respectively.
Our empirical strategy is a difference-in-differences (DID) design, comparing the prices charged
by pharmacies that experience entry of a supermarket or outlet among their main competitors
and the prices charged by pharmacies that do not experience entry of a supermarket or outlet
among their main competitors, before and after entry occurs. We use two alternative baseline
measures to define the set of main competitors of a pharmacy. One measure takes as main
competitors of a pharmacy its three nearest neighbors selling OTC drugs. The other measure
takes as main competitors of a pharmacy all retailers located within a 400-meter radius
distance. Identification comes from the different timing of exposure of incumbent pharmacies
to different types of non-pharmacy entrants among their main competitors.
Our main results show that incumbent pharmacies lower their prices by about 6% after
experiencing the entry of a supermarket among their three nearest neighbors. We do not
find evidence that outlet entry leads to price reductions by pharmacies. We find a fair
degree of heterogeneity in price responses across pharmacies operating in areas with different
degrees of market concentration with our results being driven by the most isolated pharmacies,
who likely enjoyed some degree of market power prior to experiencing entry. We obtain
similar results when using a 400-meter radius to define the set of main competitors of a
pharmacy. We interpret our findings in the context of a model based on Salop (1979) with
non-pharmacy entrants differing from incumbent pharmacies in their marginal cost and, in
particular, supermarkets being more efficient.
Our results do not seem to be driven by existing pre-treatment trends and survive a battery
of robustness checks. When varying the number of nearest neighbors and the radius distance
that define the set of main competitors of a pharmacy, we find that the statistical significance
of our results falls quickly as we enlarge the set of main competitors of a pharmacy, suggesting
competition is fairly localized. The causal interpretation of our findings, however, rests on
the assumption that market structure is exogenous so that exposure to non-pharmacy entry
is random. We address endogeneity concerns in two ways. First, we implement a propensity
score matching DID approach, with propensity scores being a function of pre-entry levels of
competitive pressure and demand faced by each pharmacy, and obtain results that are broadly
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in line with our main findings, although less statistically significant. Second, we estimate
a reduced-form entry model in which the probability that a pharmacy faces non-pharmacy
entry is a function of past prices. We find no evidence of an association between past prices
and non-pharmacy entry.
Our findings contribute to the empirical literature on OTC drug pricing and the effects of
OTC market liberalization in Europe. This literature is scarce, mostly descriptive, and often
unable to confirm the expected downward trend in OTC prices (OECD, 2014; Vogler et al.,
2014). We show that OTC liberalization reforms can lower prices via increased competition,
though this crucially depends on the ability of entrants to exert competitive pressure on
incumbent pharmacies.
Our study also contributes to a broader literature within industrial organization on the price
effects following the entry of supermarkets and chain stores in general in a market previously
composed of small, independent firms, as is the case of traditional pharmacies in Portugal.3
Bennett and Yin (2019) study the entry of a retail pharmacy chain in India on the price of
incumbent pharmacies. Basker (2005) studies the effect of Walmart entry on average city-level
prices, and Basker and Noel (2009) estimate its effects on competitors’ prices. We contribute
to this literature by providing evidence for the OTC drug market.
The remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 2 provides institutional background on
the Portuguese OTC market and the liberalization process. Section 3 describes the dataset
and Section 4 presents the empirical strategy. Section 5 presents the results and Section 6
concludes.
2 Institutional background
Traditionally, community pharmacies enjoyed a monopoly for selling both prescription and
OTC drugs. In Portugal, their monopoly for selling OTC drugs ended with Decree-Law
n. 134/2005 (August 16, 2005), which allowed the sale of OTC drugs outside pharmacies.4
Prescription drugs remain available only at traditional pharmacies.
The first non-pharmacy retailers entered the OTC market in October 2005. Non-pharmacy
3Traditional pharmacies in Portugal are independently owned due to existing ownership restrictions which
limit the number of pharmacies that an agent can own. Ownership restrictions are common and seek to ensure
a certain degree of market competition. Recently, organized groups of independently-owned pharmacies were
created, but our data are prior to that.
4The Portuguese government announced the intention to liberalize the OTC market a few months before
Decree-Law 134/2005 was passed. We cannot completely rule out that pharmacies adopted strategies other
than pricing to prevent non-pharmacy entry. Nevertheless, the fact that non-pharmacy entry took off quickly
after liberalization, combined with pharmacies not being used to operate in a competitive environment, leaves
less scope for such strategic behavior.
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retailers can be of two types: supermarkets and outlets (parafarmácias).
In supermarkets, by regulation, OTC drugs are not are freely accessible to customers. They
are placed either in a closed shelf located behind the cashiers’ check-out counter, or in a
dedicated area together with other wellness products. Either way, customers wishing to
purchase a given OTC drug must request it from the cashier or the employee attending to
the dedicated area. Most supermarkets selling OTC drugs in Lisbon belong to either one of
the two biggest supermarket chains in Portugal.
Non-pharmacy outlets are stores selling cosmetics, baby care products, vitamins and supple-
ments, among others. OTC drugs represented a natural expansion of their product range.
Outlets can be either independently owned or part of small chains of two or three stores.
Non-pharmacy retailers wishing to enter the Portuguese OTC market must apply for a
license at the National Authority of Medicines and Health Products (Infarmed) and satisfy
specific requirements related to drug storage, qualification of personnel, etc. Application by
supermarket and outlet chains is done individually by each store belonging to the chain as
opposed to one license application for all stores belonging to the chain.
The entry of supermarkets and outlets in the OTC market took place quickly following market
liberalization.5 In the first quarter of 2009 there were over 800 non-pharmacies in Portugal,
and by the end of 2017 there were about 1,200. The volume share of OTC drugs in the total
outpatient pharmaceutical market was 16.5% by the end of 2017. The corresponding value
share was 11.7%. The non-pharmacy volume share of the OTC sector in Portugal has risen
continuously since market liberalization, plateauing at 20% in 2014 (Infarmed, 2018).
3 Data
Our data consists of the prices of five popular OTC drugs charged by all pharmacies, super-
markets, and outlets located in the municipality of Lisbon for three different points in time,
the years of 2006, 2010, and 2015.
The five OTC drugs are Aspirina 500mg (20 pills, Bayer), Cêgripe (20 pills, Jassen-Cilag Ltd.),
Trifene200 (20 pills, Medinfar), Mebocáına Forte (20 tablets, Novartis), and Tantum Verde
(mouthwash, Angelini). These drugs tackle simple conditions such as fever and headaches
(Aspirina), colds (Cêgripe), menstrual pain (Trifene200), sore throat (Mebocáına Forte), and
toothache and gum swelling (Tantum Verde). They are among the top-selling OTC drugs in
Portugal. In 2009, these five drugs accounted for 10.8% of the volume sales of OTC drugs
outside pharmacies. All of them featured in the top 15 best-selling drugs in volume and 3 of
5Throughout the paper, entry in the OTC market refers to the moment at which a retailer is granted a
license to sell OTC drugs.
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them featured in the top 10 (Infarmed, IP, 2010).6 They are well-known brands to consumers
and often advertised in the media. More importantly, they are available at all retailers.7
Price data for 2006 were kindly provided by Simões et al. (2006), who collected them between
March and April. We then carried out two additional rounds of data collection, in 2010 and
2015. Infarmed keeps an on-line, updated list of all active retailers that are licensed to sell
OTC drugs. We examined these lists before each data collection round and identified the
active retailers and their exact locations. We collected price data for 2010 and 2015 between
December 2010 and February 2011 and between February and April 2015, respectively.
Though Simões et al. (2006) visited every OTC retailer in 2006, some retailers were not willing
to disclose price information, resulting in some missing price data for that year. When we
carried out the data collection in 2010 and 2015, we purchased the drugs at retailers whose
staff refused to disclose prices. In these two periods we observe prices for all retailers located
in Lisbon.
We use the latitude and longitude coordinates of each retailer to identify its main competitors
at each time period. We also construct indicators for retailer type (traditional pharmacy,
supermarket or outlet) and the parish where each retailer is located.8 Finally, we have data
from the 2001 Portuguese census on the population living in the census block where each
retailer is located.
We follow retailers over the three time periods for which we have data. Our dataset is
unbalanced because there are retailers entering and exiting the market between each data
collection round. Online Appendix S2 shows maps of the OTC market structure in Lisbon
for the years 2006, 2010, and 2015. The number of supermarkets selling OTC drugs in our
dataset increased over time, from 1 in 2006 to 25 in 2015. The number of outlets selling
OTC drugs raised from 8 in 2006 to 25 in 2010 and then slightly declined to 21 in 2015. The
number of traditional pharmacies has been declining over time, from 301 in 2006 to 259 in
2015.
We now highlight a few patterns present in our data. The average prices of the drugs under
analysis increased over time, as did their variance. All supermarkets in our data belong to su-
permarket chains and each chain adopts a common pricing strategy, rather than store-specific
prices that reflect the competitive environment faced by each store belonging to the chain.
On average, supermarkets charge about 20% lower prices than traditional pharmacies for the
sample of OTC drugs we analyze. This might be due to economies of scale in the distribution
6After 2009, Infarmed stopped releasing sales data by commercial designation, so we do not have more
recent figures.
7Supermarkets and outlets typically carry a smaller selection of OTC drugs than pharmacies.
8Portuguese municipalities are composed of smaller areas called parishes. The number and geographic
borders of the Lisbon parishes were revised in 2012. According to the revised version, which we use in our
analysis, there are 24 parishes in Lisbon.
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chain of supermarkets, more efficient practices regarding stock management and logistics,
and stronger bargaining position when engaging in price negotiations with suppliers due to
larger quantities purchased. All of these result, cumulatively, in lower marginal costs, leading
to lower equilibrium prices for supermarkets. Outlet prices are, on average, 4% lower than
those of traditional pharmacies. Outlets are either independent stores or part of very small




We use a DID strategy to assess the price effects following the entry of non-pharmacy retailers.
Non-pharmacy entry started before our first round of data collection. However, non-pharmacy
entry took place gradually, meaning that each pharmacy experiences entry of different types
of non-pharmacies among its main competitors at different points in time. This is our source
of identification.
We start by defining the set of main competitors of pharmacy i. One way to define the
main competitors of a pharmacy is to consider its N nearest neighbors in terms of walking
distance as main competitors.9 Another way to define the main competitors of pharmacy i is
to consider all retailers located within a radius R centered around i as main competitors. We
use these two alternative definitions of main competitors throughout our analysis.
An incumbent pharmacy is “treated” if it experiences the entry of a non-pharmacy retailer
among its main competitors. Prior to treatment, its set of main competitors consists only of
traditional pharmacies. Because supermarkets and outlets charge different prices, they might
exert different levels of competitive pressure on incumbent pharmacies and generate different
price effects. We therefore distinguish two types of treatment, SUPERi and OUTLETi,
depending on whether the non-pharmacy entrant faced by pharmacy i is a supermarket or an
outlet, respectively. Additionally, for each type of treatment we distinguish three treatment
cohorts, c, according to treatment timing. Each of the two types of treatment can take place
either before 2006 (c = 1, the first and earliest treatment cohort), between 2006 and 2010
(c = 2, the second treatment cohort), or between 2010 and 2015 (c = 3, the third and latest
9We use walking distances instead of straight-line distances to define the nearest competitors of each
pharmacy. This accounts for physical barriers that might cause two nearby retailers not to be regarded as
competitors by consumers, ie. a high-speed road. We measured walking distances between retailers after each
data collection round because they can change over time due to urban development, ie. a new aerial bridge
might be built allowing consumers to easily cross over a high-speed road.
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treatment cohort). In total there are six treatment groups corresponding to two types of
treatment and three treatment cohorts. The control group is composed of pharmacies who
never face non-pharmacies among their main competitors.
We estimate the price differences between each treatment group and the control group at each
of our sample years. The regression counterpart of these differences is as follows:
Pikt = θ
super
ct × δtSUPERci + θoutletct × δtOUTLET ci (1)
+ δt + γk + αi + εikt,
with SUPERci = {SUPER1i , SUPER2i , SUPER3i }
and OUTLET ci = {OUTLET 1i , OUTLET 2i , OUTLET 3i }
In equation (1), i indexes the pharmacy, t indexes time in years, k indexes the drug, and
c indexes the treatment cohort. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the
price charged by pharmacy i, for drug k in year t. SUPERci and OUTLET
c
i are vectors of
indicators for each of the three cohorts that experienced the entry of a supermarket and outlet,
respectively, among their main competitors.10 For example, SUPER2i is a binary indicator
taking value 1 in case pharmacy i experienced the entry of a supermarket among its main
competitors between 2006 and 2010 (the second treatment cohort), and value 0 otherwise.
Similarly, OUTLET 3i is a binary indicator taking value 1 if pharmacy i experienced the entry
of an outlet among its main competitors between 2010 and 2015 (the third treatment cohort).
δt is a vector containing fixed-effects for years 2010 and 2015. γk and αi are drug and retailer
fixed-effects, respectively. εikt is an error term.
The main coefficients of interest are θsuperct and θ
outlet
ct , corresponding to interactions between
the treatment groups and year fixed-effects. Their estimates convey the price impact of
non-pharmacy entry on incumbent pharmacies and their dynamics over time. To be more
precise, θsuperct conveys the price difference in year t between pharmacies that experience entry
of a supermarket among their main competitors in treatment cohort c and pharmacies in the
control group. An analogous interpretation applies to θoutletct for outlet entry.
Our empirical design is as flexible as possible, given that we only have data for three time
points in time. Pharmacies experiencing supermarket and outlet entry after 2010 are observed
twice prior to treatment, in 2006 and in 2010. The estimates of θsuper3,2010 and θ
outlet
3,2010 correspond
10We use indicator variables for facing non-pharmacy entry, as opposed to measures of the general level of
competitive pressure faced by a pharmacy. This is because we are specifically interested on the additional
competitive pressure originating from the entry of different types of retailers, supermarkets and outlets. Our
main interest is not on the general level of competitive pressure originating from a higher density of traditional
pharmacies in an area, which has been assessed in previous literature (see, for example, Pilorge, 2016).
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to price differences in 2010 between these pharmacies and the control group. Because these are
price differences prior to treatment, the statistical significance of these estimates is informative
about the plausibility of the parallel trend assumption.
Additionally, pharmacies experiencing supermarket and outlet entry between 2006 and 2010
are observed twice after treatment, in 2010 and in 2015. The estimates of θsuper2,2015 and θ
outlet
2,2015
correspond to price differences in 2015 between these pharmacies and the control group.
θsuper2,2010 and θ
outlet
2,2010, in turn, convey a more immediate price impact of non-pharmacy entry on
these pharmacies because they reflect price differences relative to the control group in 2010.
Comparing these two pairs of estimates allows us to assess the persistence of the price effects
induced by non-pharmacy entry.
When taking our model to the data, we select specific values of N and R. We set N = 3 for
our baseline nearest neighbor specification. In this case, the treatments consist on the entry
of a supermarket or outlet in the set of 3 nearest neighbors before 2006, between 2006 and
2010, or between 2010 and 2015. We set R = 400 meters for our baseline radius specification.
Under this definition, the treatments consist on the entry of a supermarket or outlet within a
400-meter radius before 2006, between 2006 and 2010, or between 2010 and 2015. We vary
our choices of N and R in robustness checks.
We estimate equation (1) using fixed-effects at the pharmacy level, thus differencing out
all time-invariant, pharmacy-specific characteristics.11 We cluster standard errors at the
pharmacy level to account for serial correlation in pharmacy pricing decisions.12
Since our main interest is on the effects on the pricing of incumbent pharmacies, we estimate
our baseline model among pharmacies only. Throughout most of our analysis, we focus on
samples in which all treatment and control groups are mutually exclusive.13 Thus, the number
of pharmacies used in the estimation and the number of pharmacies in the treatment and
control groups varies with the definition of main competitors. Table 1 shows the composition
11Our results are similar when using a random effects specification with parish and treatment group
fixed-effects (online Appendix S3.1). From a statistical viewpoint, the random-effects model assumes the
constant retailer-specific terms αi to be independent drawings from an underlying population of retailers (see,
for example, Heij et al. (2004)). Since our data contains the universe of retailers operating in Lisbon, this
assumption seems less appropriate in our case. A Hausman test also favors the fixed-effects specification, so
we use it throughout our analysis.
12This clustering option is common when defining markets around a focal retailer (see Hosken et al., 2008)
because in such settings retailers are the relevant unit at which treatment assignment occurs. This is also in
line with the recommendations of Abadie et al. (2017) to cluster standard errors at the level of treatment
variation. We experimented with alternative ways of clustering the standard errors, namely two-way clustering
by pharmacy and drug. This does not affect the significance of our results (Table S3.9 in the online Appendix).
13Pharmacies experiencing non-pharmacy entry at several points in time, or experiencing both supermarket
and outlet entry are disregarded from most of our analysis. This avoids having many interaction terms
in the model whose identification relies on very few pharmacies and it simplifies the construction of the
propensity-score matched sample. Our results are unchanged if we include pharmacies that experienced
multiple treatments (Table S3.6 in the online Appendix).
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Table 1: Composition of control and treatment groups in the baseline sample
Definition of main competitors
3 nearest neighbors 400-meter radius
2006 2010 2015 2006 2010 2015
Control group 152 220 197 136 206 186
Supermarket entry before 2006 2 2 2 0 0 0
Supermarket entry in 2006/10 6 6 6 5 5 5
Supermarket entry in 2010/15 13 13 13 6 6 6
Outlet entry before 2006 8 8 8 9 7 6
Outlet entry in 2006/10 10 10 10 14 14 12
Outlet entry in 2010/15 11 11 11 12 12 12
Total 202 270 247 182 250 227
NOTES: The table shows the number of pharmacies included in the baseline estimation samples
per treatment group and year for our two alternative definitions of main competitors. In the first
three columns the main competitors of a pharmacy are defined as its three nearest neighbors. In
the last three columns, the main competitors of a pharmacy are defined as all retailers located
within a 400-meter radius. The lower number of pharmacies in the control group in 2006 is a
consequence of missing price data for that year, as discussed in Section 3. Within a definition of
main competitors, we focus on a sample of pharmacies for which all the treatment groups and
the control group are mutually exclusive.
of the treatment and control groups for our baseline choices of main competitors: the three
nearest neighbors and the retailers located within a 400-meter radius.14 In the specific case of
the 400-meter radius measure, no pharmacies experienced entry of a supermarket before 2006
so that treatment group is empty. Each pharmacy belongs to the same group throughout
all time periods in which it is observed. However, the number of pharmacies in each group
can vary over time due to market entry and exit. For example, Table 1 conveys that some
of the pharmacies that experienced entry of an outlet within a 400-meter radius exited the
market. The increase in the number of pharmacies in the control group between 2006 and
2010 reflects the missing price data for 2006, as discussed in Section 3.
One concern is that pharmacies in the control group and those that eventually face non-
pharmacy entry are already somewhat different prior to treatment. In Table 2 we compare
the pre-treatment means of our main variables for pharmacies in the control group and those
treated after 2006. We do this for our two alternative measures of main competitors. We
14Table S4.1 in the online Appendix shows the composition of control and treatment groups for different
choices of N and R used in robustness checks.
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Table 2: Testing for mean differences between groups of pharmacies at baseline (2006)
Control group Eventually treated Difference P-value
Main competitors: 3 nearest neighbors
Price Aspirina 500mg (e ) 3.033 2.996 0.026 0.378
Price Cêgripe (e ) 4.312 4.195 0.118*** 0.002
Price Trifene200 (e ) 3.348 3.255 0.093** 0.041
Price Mebocáına Forte (e ) 4.676 4.613 0.062 0.238
Price Tantum Verde (e ) 4.987 4.848 0.139** 0.047
Avg distance to 3 nearest neighbors (km) 0.241 0.274 -0.035 0.241
Avg walking time to 3 nearest neighbors (min) 5.161 5.800 -0.639 0.323
Population in census block (as of 2001) 589.024 723.286 -125.262*** 0.002
Main competitors: 400-meter radius
Price Aspirina 500mg (e ) 3.026 3.004 0.022 0.554
Price Cêgripe (e ) 4.323 4.240 0.083** 0.027
Price Trifene200 (e ) 3.340 3.285 0.055 0.149
Price Mebocáına Forte (e ) 4.675 4.688 -0.013 0.213
Price Tantum Verde (e ) 4.995 4.913 0.082 0.418
Number of retailers within radius 4.940 4.838 0.102 0.864
Population in census block (as of 2001) 590.694 646.255 -55.561 0.104
NOTES: The table shows the 2006 mean of several variables of interest across pharmacies in the control
and treatment groups for our two alternative measures of main competitors. In the top panel, the main
competitors of a pharmacy are its three nearest neighbors and in the bottom panel they are all retailers located
within a 400-meter radius. For each panel, the first column reports averages across pharmacies belonging to
the control group. The second column reports averages across pharmacies which were not yet treated in 2006,
but will eventually face the entry of a non-pharmacy amongst their three nearest competitors, thus grouping
together pharmacies facing the entry of a supermarket or an outlet either between 2006 and 2010, or between
2010 and 2015. Pharmacies already treated in 2006 are not accounted for in this table because they are not
observed prior to treatment. The third column computes the difference of columns 1 and 2, and column 4
shows the corresponding two-sided p-value. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
exclude pharmacies who experienced non-pharmacy entry before 2006, as for these we have
no pre-treatment observations. Pharmacies that eventually experience non-pharmacy entry
charge lower prices for some of the drugs under analysis in 2006 and they tend to be located
in areas with higher population. This motivates the estimation of equation (1) on a matched
sample of pharmacies (Section 4.2).15
Entry is expected to have stronger effects in areas where market structure is more concentrated,
i.e. closer to a monopoly. We assess this hypothesis by estimating equation (1) among the
most and the least spatially isolated pharmacies, alternatively. We define the most spatially
isolated pharmacies based on information for 2006. In the case of our nearest neighbors
15Table S4.2 in the online Appendix replicates this exercise for alternative treatment group definitions based
on different choices of N and R used in robustness checks.
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measure of main competitors, the most (least) spatially isolated pharmacies are those whose
walking time in minutes to their third nearest competitor is above (below) the sample median
in 2006. For our radius measure of competition, the most (least) spatially isolated pharmacies
are those whose number of competitors within a 400-meter radius in 2006 is below (above)
the sample median.
Our control group may be contaminated by second-order effects related to the entry of
non-pharmacies. That is, if pharmacy A experiences the entry of non-pharmacy B among
its main competitors, A might lower its price (first-order effect). That may cause C, who is
in the control group and has A but not B among its main competitors, to change its price
as a response to the price change of A (second-order effect). We mitigate this concern by
restricting the control group to pharmacies whose main competitors are in the control group
themselves. This robustness check is informative about whether our choice for the set of main
competitors, and our definitions of control and treatment groups are adequate.
The maps of the market structure of the OTC market in Lisbon in online Appendix S2 show
that some retailers exited the market during our study-period. Most of these were pharmacies.
In robustness checks, we address pharmacy exit in several ways. First, we estimate equation
(1) on a balanced panel of pharmacies. Second, we estimate equation (1) among pharmacies
whose main competitors do not exit the market.16 Third, we assess whether experiencing the
entry of a non-pharmacy retailer makes pharmacies more likely to exit the market in the future.
Specifically, we estimate a logit model whose dependent variable is a binary indicator taking
value 1 in case pharmacy i exits the market before the next round of data collection, and value
0 otherwise. The independent variables are treatment group indicators, year fixed-effects, and
parish fixed-effects. If the estimates corresponding to the treatment group indicators are not
statistically different from zero, then experiencing entry of a supermarket or outlet does not
systematically cause pharmacies to exit the market.
4.2 Endogeneity of market structure
Our estimates from equation (1) can only be interpreted as causal if entry and location
decisions of non-pharmacies are exogenous. The decision to open a supermarket or outlet in
a given location is plausibly unrelated to pharmacy market structure, as OTC drugs are a
16There can be variation in competition both from entry and from exit of OTC retailers that compose the
set of main competitors of a pharmacy (ie, their three closest neighbors or the retailers within a 400-meter
radius). We are interested in variation originating from entry of non-pharmacies, not exit of pharmacies. In
order to isolate the former, we focus on a subsample of pharmacies whose main competitors do not exit the
market. Therefore, any variation in competition comes from entry of a new retailer.
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small subset of their product range.17 However, it is more difficult to defend the exogeneity
assumption when not all retailers belonging to a given chain apply for a license to sell OTC
drugs.
One potential threat is the existence of retailer-specific unobservables that affect both prices
charged by incumbent pharmacies and entry of non-pharmacies. To the extent that these
are time-invariant, they are captured by the retailer fixed effects in our model. However,
there can also be time-varying, retailer-specific unobservables if, for example, certain retailers
experience demand shocks due to the natural course of urban development, gentrification of
certain neighborhoods, etc. These shocks are difficult to measure at the small geographic
level we are working with.
In an attempt to mitigate this concern, we combine propensity score matching with our
DID design (Heckman et al., 1997; Smith and Todd, 2005). The underlying intuition is that
by matching treated and untreated pharmacies on their propensity score, that is, on their
probability of being treated, we make treated and control groups more similar in terms of
the observables used in the estimation of the propensity score. Thus, treatment should be
random, conditional on those observables. We estimate the propensity score as a function of
the levels of competitive pressure and demand faced by each pharmacy prior to experiencing
non-pharmacy entry.18 We then use the estimated propensity scores to build a matched
sample of pharmacies using single neighbor matching.19 Finally, we estimate equation (1) in
this matched sample.
Another potential threat is that, in addition to pharmacies adjusting their prices in the
presence of a non-pharmacy, non-pharmacies make location decisions based on prices charged
by existing pharmacies in the area. That is, non-pharmacy entrants select where to enter
the market based on past prices in the area. For example, entrants might chose to enter
17In the particular case of supermarket chains, OTC drugs seem to correspond to a small share of total
sales. For example, in 2014 the supermarket chain with the largest OTC sales value was Pingo Doce with
Me 8.3 nationwide (Infarmed, IP, 2015). Its total sales value was Me 3,234 (Jerónimo Martins SGPS SA,
2015). At the time OTC drugs were available at 74 of a total of 380 stores existing Pingo Doce in Portugal.
Assuming stores are symmetric, on average, OTC drugs amount to 1.3% of total sales value per store.
18Specifically, demand is measured as population living in the census block where the pharmacy is located,
as of 2001. Competitive pressure is measured by the average walking time, in minutes, to the three closest
competitors as of 2006 when defining the main competitors of a pharmacy as its three nearest neighbors.
When considering all retailers located within a 400m radius, competitive pressure is measured by the total
number of retailers located inside the 400m radius in 2006. Since both measures of demand and competitive
pressure are continuous, we categorize them into quintiles and use the categorized variables for the matching.
We disregard the groups that were treated already in 2006 in the matching, as for those we do not observe a
pre-treatment period level of competitive pressure. In online Appendix S6 we provide additional technical
details on the PSM procedure.
19As an alternative matching algorithm, we use local linear regression to build the matched sample. The
results are shown in online Appendix S3.8 and are similar to those for the matched sample using single
neighbor matching.
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in areas where prices are higher as there they could potentially only slightly undercut the
incumbents and make higher profits. We address this concern by assuming a sequential game
in which in year t− 1 supermarkets and outlets make joint entry and location decisions for
year t, taking into account (functions of) t− 1 prices charged by the pharmacies they would
be competing with. Then in year t entry is realized and observed, and all players make their
pricing decisions for that year taking entry as given. We have no information on retailers that
did not enter the market. Thus, we use the fact that we observe entry in certain locations,
but not in others. For this analysis, retailers are the relevant unit of observation and the
prices of each of the five OTC drugs are aggregated to generate an OTC bundle price which
is retailer-year specific, Pit =
∑5
k=1 Pikt.
20 The equation taken to the data is as follows:
entry∗it = β0 + β1ζ(Pi,t−1) + δt + λj + εit, εit ∼ iid logistic (2)
entryit =
1 if entry∗it > 0,0 if entry∗it ≤ 0
where entry∗it is a latent variable representing the probability that pharmacy i experiences the
entry of a non-pharmacy among its main competitors in year t. Although we do not observe
this probability, we observe whether a pharmacy experienced non-pharmacy entry at a given
point in time, entryit. Thus, entryit is a binary indicator taking value 1 in case pharmacy
i experienced the entry of a supermarket or outlet among its main competitors in year t,
and value 0 otherwise. ζ(Pt−1) is a functional form through which past prices affect entry
and location decisions by supermarkets or outlets. ζ is, alternatively, the t− 1 price charged
by pharmacy i (Pit−1), and the ratio between Pit−1 and the average t − 1 price among all
retailers operating in Lisbon. The remaining terms are time and parish fixed effects, δt and
λj, respectively. εit is a logistically-distributed error term. Since we take lags of price, the
model is estimated using the years 2010 and 2015 only and the lags are taken with respect to
the previous period for which we have data. We estimate separate models for the probability
of experiencing entry of a supermarket or an outlet, and for our two definitions of main
competitors. If the estimates of β1 are not statistically different from zero in these models,
then entry and location decisions of supermarkets and outlets are not driven by past prices
charged by pharmacies operating in that location for the five drugs under analysis.
20We acknowledge that this is a relatively coarse measure of prices in a geographical area, because we
are only considering five OTC drugs and these five particular OTC drugs might poorly represent the prices




Table 3 shows our main results. In the first column we consider the main competitors of a
pharmacy to be its three nearest neighbors and in column 2 we consider its main competitors
to be the retailers located within a 400-meter radius. The results are broadly similar across
the two definitions of main competitors. Overall, the entry of a supermarket among the
main competitors of a pharmacy is associated with long-lasting price reductions. In 2010,
pharmacies who faced the entry of a supermarket amongst their main competitors between
2006 and 2010 charged 6-7% lower prices than those in the control group. In 2015, this very
same group of pharmacies was still charging, on average, 4-6% lower prices than pharmacies
in the control group.21 The effects are insignificant for pharmacies experiencing entry of
a supermarket between 2010 and 2015. While pharmacies experiencing supermarket entry
before 2006 charge 2-3% lower prices than those in the control group both in 2010 and 2015,
we do not know how their prices compared to the control group pre-entry and thus do not
put too much emphasis on this result.
The entry of an outlet among the main competitors of a pharmacy is not associated with
price reductions. The finding that incumbent pharmacies react differently to supermarket
and outlet entry is consistent with a model in the spirit of Salop (1979), where competition is
localized and non-pharmacy entrants can have a cost-advantage or cost-disadvantage relative
to traditional pharmacies. We outline such a model in online Appendix S1. In our model,
the extent to which pharmacies lower prices after experiencing non-pharmacy entry depends
on two distinct forces. On the one hand, there is now a closer competitor which creates
downward pressure on incumbent prices. On the other hand, due to the localized nature of
competition, incumbents may face a softer or tougher rival at the margin. In case of a more
efficient entrant, both these forces go in the direction of lowering pharmacy prices (closer
and more efficient rival). In case of a less efficient entrant, the two forces work in opposite
directions and the total impact on pharmacy prices is ambiguous. In our setting, entry by
large supermarket chains is likely to be approximated by the low-cost entrant, reflecting their
cost advantage in logistics, management and, eventually, bargaining power with wholesalers.
The entry of outlets, in turn, might be better approximated by the higher-cost entrant.
In the last two rows of Table 3, we compare the prices charged in 2010 by pharmacies that
experience non-pharmacy entry only after 2010 with those charged by pharmacies in the
control group. The lack of statistical significance of these estimates supports the plausibility
21To put these effects into perspective, the entry of a pharmacy chain in India is associated with a 2% price
decline among incumbents (Bennett and Yin, 2019), and the entry of Walmart, which charged on average
10% lower prices, is associated with a 1-1.2% price decrease by its competitors (Basker and Noel, 2009) and a
short-run average city-level price decrease in the range of 1.5-3% (Basker, 2005).
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Table 3: Estimates of θ from equation (1), baseline and matched samples
No matching Single neighbor matching
3 nearest neighbors 400m radius 3 nearest neighbors 400m radius
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DiD estimates:
2010×Supermarket entry before 2006 (θsuper1,2010) -0.027***
(0.008)
2015×Supermarket entry before 2006 (θsuper1,2015) -0.038***
(0.013)
2010×Supermarket entry in 2006/10 (θsuper2,2010) -0.064*** -0.076*** -0.055* -0.053**
(0.019) (0.015) (0.033) (0.026)
2015×Supermarket entry in 2006/10 (θsuper2,2015) -0.064*** -0.038* -0.080** -0.010
(0.022) (0.023) (0.035) (0.031)
2015×Supermarket entry in 2010/15 (θsuper3,2015) -0.015 -0.025 -0.030 0.009
(0.016) (0.017) (0.027) (0.025)
2010×Outlet entry before 2006 (θoutlet1,2010) 0.013 -0.031
(0.020) (0.022)
2015×Outlet entry before 2006 (θoutlet1,2015) -0.005 -0.033*
(0.010) (0.019)
2010×Outlet entry in 2006/10 (θoutlet2,2010) 0.009 -0.006 0.019 0.010
(0.023) (0.017) (0.022) (0.023)
2015×Outlet entry in 2006/10 (θoutlet2,2015) 0.015 -0.015 -0.001 -0.024
(0.021) (0.020) (0.025) (0.026)
2015×Outlet entry in 2010/15 (θoutlet3,2015) -0.001 0.035* -0.016 0.060**
(0.034) (0.021) (0.035) (0.025)
Pre-treatment trends:
2010×Supermarket entry in 2010/15 (θsuper3,2010) -0.009 -0.041 0.000 0.020
(0.027) (0.033) (0.024) (0.024)
2010×Outlet entry in 2010/15 (θoutlet3,2010) -0.007 0.011 0.003 0.040*
(0.018) (0.015) (0.023) (0.022)
N 3,429 3,280 970 960
R2 0.912 0.913 0.913 0.903
NOTES: Estimates of θsuper and θoutlet based on the estimation of equation (1) among traditional pharmacies.
In columns 1 and 3 the main competitors of pharmacy i are its 3 nearest neighbors. In columns 2 and 4 the
main competitors of pharmacy i are the retailers located with a 400-meter radius. The first two columns
estimate the model in the original sample. The last two columns estimate the model on a matched sample of
treated and control pharmacies (matching was done using single neighbor matching on propensity scores).
We disregard the groups that were treated already in 2006 in the matching, as for those we do not observe a
pre-treatment period. All specifications include year, drug, and pharmacy fixed-effects. Standard errors are
shown in parenthesis. In columns 1 and 2 standard errors are clustered at the pharmacy level. In columns 3
and 4 standard errors are bootstrapped using 30 repetitions drawn cross-sectionally at the pharmacy level in
the original sample. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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of the common trend assumption, but their magnitude is sometimes not too different from
our main effects. Figure S5.5 in the online Appendix plots raw prices for the two groups of
pharmacies treated after 2010 and the control group. These plots do not suggest different
trends across groups, though we would need a longer panel to make a stronger claim regarding
this matter.
In the last two columns of Table 3 we report the results from estimating equation (1) on a
matched sample of treated and control pharmacies, with matching done using single neighbor
matching on propensity scores. The size of the matched sample is considerably smaller than
the size of the baseline sample. While the results obtained with the matched sample go in the
same direction as the ones obtained with the baseline sample, some statistical significance is
lost.
Table S3.2 in the online Appendix shows that our results are driven by the most spatially
isolated pharmacies as of 2006, who enjoyed some degree of market power before experiencing
entry. Our baseline results are robust to estimating the model on a balanced panel of
pharmacies, including all retailer types, including pharmacies that are in multiple treatment
groups, restricting the sample to pharmacies whose main competitors are in the control group
themselves, and restricting the sample to pharmacies whose main competitors do not exit the
market (Tables S3.5, S3.3, S3.6, S3.4, and S3.7 in the online Appendix, respectively).
We vary the values of N and R for the definitions of main competitors in online Appendix
S4. The findings from that exercise convey the fact that competition in the OTC market is
very localized. For example, increasing N from 3 to 5 shows very few statistically significant
price effects following non-pharmacy entry. Similarly, when enlarging the radius within which
main competitors are located from 400 to 600 or 800 meters most of the price effects vanish
(see Table S4.3 in online Appendix S4 for the baseline results and the following tables for
robustness checks).
Experiencing the entry of a non-pharmacy retailer does not seem to cause pharmacies to exit
the market before the next round of data collection (Table S3.10 in the online Appendix).22
Finally, Table 4 shows the results of the reduced-form entry model. These do not support the
claim that non-pharmacies make entry decisions based on the prices charged by pharmacies
already operating in that area because the estimate of β1 in equation (2) is never statistically
significant. Because our reduced-form entry model has a very specific functional form, we
22Exit of traditional pharmacies cannot be directly linked to the liberalization of the OTC market, as the
share of OTC drugs on total pharmacy revenue is probably too small to produce such an impact. Instead, it
is more likely a consequence of the overall economic environment and the squeezing of pharmacy margins
on prescription drugs (Barros, 2012). This is consistent with the figures in Table 1, showing that the vast
majority of the pharmacies who exited the market were in the control group. In Table S7.1 in the Online
Appendix we provide a brief overview of the main regulations affecting pharmacy profitability that were
passed between 2005 and 2015.
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Table 4: Results from the estimation of the reduced-form entry model




Pit−1 relatively to average market price -0.999 -1.289
(4.293) (1.262)
400m radius Pit−1 -0.865 0.665
(2.226) (0.836)
400m radius Pit−1 relatively to average market price -1.432 0.548
(7.868) (0.820)
NOTES: Marginal effects of β1 from RE logit estimation of equation (6), with dependent
variable being an indicator for facing the entry of a supermarket (column 1) and an
outlet (column 2). There are two panels. The top panel takes the main competitors of
pharmacy i as its three nearest neighbors. The bottom panel takes the main competitors
of pharmacy i as the retailers located within a 400-meter radius. In each of the
panels, the first row tests whether pharmacy i facing the entry of a supermarket/outlet
among its main competitors depends on the prices it charged in the previous period,
ζ(Pt−1) = Pit−1. The corresponding figures can be interpreted as the percentage-point
change in the probability of facing entry associated with a 1% higher OTC bundle
price in the previous period. The second row tests whether it depends on the lagged
prices of pharmacy i relatively to the average bundle price in the city of Lisbon. The
corresponding figures can be interpreted as the percentage-point change associated
with a 1-unit increase in the independent variable. Recall that our estimation sample
differs according to how we define the set of main competitors of pharmacy i, so
that a different number of observations is used to obtain each estimate shown on
the table. Standard errors shown in parenthesis are clustered at the pharmacy level.
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01.
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create bar charts of the share of pharmacies in each of the deciles of current and past prices for
the bundle of drugs we analyze. We do this separately by year and by type of non-pharmacy
entrant. If entry is in any way related to current or past prices, then these plots should convey
a non-random relationship. In particular, if entry occurred in locations which were potentially
more profitable because they had higher prices, then pharmacies in the highest price deciles
would experience the largest shares of entry by non-pharmacies. We find no such pattern
(Figures S5.1 and S5.3 in the online Appendix). A similar analysis using deciles of resident
population instead of price deciles yields again no clear pattern (Figures S5.2 and S5.4 in the
online Appendix).
6 Concluding remarks
We use unique OTC price data at the retailer level for the city of Lisbon to examine the effects
of non-pharmacy entry on the prices of incumbent pharmacies. We show that non-pharmacy
entry can be successful at fostering competition and lowering prices charged by pharmacies.
However, the extent to which this occurs depends crucially on the type non-pharmacy entrant
and, particularly, on their ability to exert competitive pressure on incumbent pharmacies.
Supermarkets in our sample charge about 20% lower prices than pharmacies, whereas outlets
charge 4% lower prices than pharmacies. This means that supermarkets have a greater ability
to exert competitive pressure on pharmacies than outlets.
Our baseline results reflect those differences. While incumbent pharmacies charge 4-6% lower
prices than the control group after experiencing the entry of a supermarket among their
main competitors, they do not seem to react to the entry of an outlet. Furthermore, while
incumbent pharmacies lower their prices as a response to supermarket entry, they do not
lower prices enough so as to match the prices charged by supermarkets. This findings are
in line with predictions from a model in the Salop tradition with non-pharmacy entrants
differing from incumbents in their marginal cost.
Our results are specific to retailers operating in the municipality of Lisbon and to the set
of drugs and time periods we analyze. They might not generalize to other settings. In
particular, price reductions may not occur in rural areas, where entry of supermarkets takes
place on a smaller scale. Nevertheless, our study contributes to a deeper understanding of
how competition takes place in retail pharmaceutical OTC markets.
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We highlight the economic effects associated with OTC liberalization using a stylized model
of entry and competition in the OTC market. We consider a model in the tradition of Salop
(1979), with entry of competitors with marginal cost differences relative to incumbents. This
reflects the possibility that different types of non-pharmacy entrants may have a cost-advantage
or disadvantage relative to community pharmacies. Entry is exogenously given, to focus on
the price effects from entry.
The equilibrium price effects of entry into the OTC market will result from extra competition
due to more players in the market and from how hard marginal competition has become. In the
Salop model, competition is localized, so entry by a low cost rival creates a downward pressure
on prices from both a closer rival and a lower marginal cost, more aggressive, competitor. On
the other hand, entry by a higher cost competitor brings a balance between a closer rival
and a “softer” (higher marginal cost) competitor. The former drives down equilibrium prices
while the latter exerts pressure for increasing equilibrium prices.
We consider exogenous entry instead of the free entry equilibrium as in Salop (1979). The
existence of entry fixed costs will limit entry in a trivial way and will not add any particular
insight. Our interest lies in the price implications of entry of OTC non-pharmacy retailers
with different marginal costs, to generate testable implications.
In our setting, entry by large supermarket chains is likely to be approximated by the low-cost
entrant, reflecting their cost advantage in logistics, management and, eventually, bargaining
power with wholesalers. In areas where supermarkets enter the OTC market, we expect prices
to decrease in pharmacies. The entry of other small OTC retailers, outlets, on the other hand
may induce a richer set of effects. If they have marginal costs lower than those of pharmacies,
but higher than those of supermarkets, the same qualitative effects described for supermarkets
apply, though with lower intensity. More interesting is that, in the presence of higher cost
entrants, we cannot rule out that equilibrium prices increase. The competition effect works in
the direction of lower prices but the strategic interaction effect due to localized competition
works in the direction of higher prices whenever the entrant has higher marginal costs. Thus
the empirical prediction on the effect of entry of small OTC retailers on equilibrium prices is
ambiguous (in the absence of a strong presumption that such outlets have a marginal cost
advantage relative to pharmacies).
The model uses the simplest layout to support the above claims.23 In the pre-entry equilibrium
23Importantly, we deviate from the traditional Salop (1979) model in that we do not we do not have fixed
costs in our model. We do not explicitly model fixed costs because we want to focus on the price changes after
24
we consider two pharmacies symmetrically located on the Salop circumference of length one.
Density of consumers (patients) is 1 and uniformly distributed along the circumference. Each
consumer has a linear cost t of “travelling” to an OTC retailer. A distance x implies a total
travel cost of tx. We use x to index a patient location on the circle relative to the nearest
left-side OTC retailer. The distance to the nearest right-side retailer is denoted by d − x,
and the associated travel cost is t(d − x). The value of d is determined by the location of
OTC retailers. With n sellers, d = 1/n. Consumers of OTC products are assumed to have no
insurance coverage (either public or private) for this type of product.24
Traditional pharmacies are assumed to be profit maximizing in their decisions regarding the
price of OTC products. Pharmacies have a constant marginal cost, c, of selling an OTC
product. Supermarkets and outlets have constant marginal cost given by c+ ∆S and c+ ∆O,
respectively. We assume ∆S < 0, ∆S < ∆O, and ∆O can be greater or smaller than 0.
To keep the model as tractable as possible without losing any essential element, we assume
that entry occurs in pairs (either two supermarkets or two outlets) and that all locations are
symmetrically placed on the Salop circumference. These assumptions can be easily relaxed
without changing the qualitative nature of the result. Symmetry allows for far more tractable
expressions, from which economic intuition can be obtained.
We first characterize the market equilibrium for two symmetrically located community
pharmacies. Demand directed to each pharmacy results from patients located both to its left
















where i − 1 and i + 1 denote the locations of rivals. Note that with two pharmacies only,
pi−1 = pi+1, as the other pharmacy is both the left-side and the right-side competitor.
Profit of each pharmacy is








the entry fo non-pharmacy retailers only to obtain testable implications in reduced form equations, and we do
not characterize the equilibrium with free entry and relocation of firms within the circle. This modeling option
stems from specific features of the OTC market and our setting that may render the free-entry version do the
model unsuitable. First, relocation is costly and we do not see firms relocating in the data. Second, pharmacy
entry is regulated and non-pharmacy entry also requires approval by the regulator (Infarmed). Third, some
supermarket entrants will have fixed location as well in the sense that they were already operating before
OTC market liberalization and simply added OTC drugs to their product range. Finally, while we do observe
pharmacy exit in the data, that is likely driven by developments in the prescription drug market rather than
the OTC market. In our theoretical framework, we are only modeling the OTC segment.
24Although some OTC products are covered by the National Health Service in Portugal, most are not.
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Maximizing each firms’ profit with respect to price and solving for the symmetric price
equilibrium, we obtain the standard result of p∗ = (t/2) + c.
The next step is the characterization of the post-entry equilibrium. We assume that two
non-pharmacy OTC retailers enter the market and locate symmetrically on the circle in
relation to pharmacies’ location. Moreover, pharmacies do not relocate in response to entry.25
Our assumption of symmetric entrants also implies that entrants have the same marginal cost
(different from pharmacies marginal cost).
Demand directed at retailer i now has to accommodate the existence of more competitors,
d = 1/4. The profit of a retailer located at i is given by




− pi − pi−1
2t




with ∆ = 0 for traditional pharmacies.
Pharmacies face a symmetric situation in their decisions and so do supermarkets (or outlets).
Thus, we only need to characterize two equilibrium values of prices, one for each type of
retailer. Each pharmacy faces competition by two supermarkets/outlets and each super-
market/outlet faces competition of two pharmacies. The resulting equilibrium prices for














From these equilibrium prices it follows that for ∆E < 0 (more efficient entrants), pE < pI < p∗.
The direct competition effect of more retailers is captured by the difference (t− t/4) when
comparing pI and p∗. The strategic interaction effect from competition is associated with the
term ∆E. With ∆E > 0 different possibilities exist. Equilibrium price of pharmacies increases
if ∆E > 9/4t (and pharmacies have lower price than entrants in this case).
These results provide the conceptual background to guide the interpretation of our empirical
findings.
25Given our assumption of two entrants, the forces for maximum product differentiation and symmetric
locations is compatible with the assumption made. Moreover, it is unlikely that pharmacies will relocate
geographically as OTC are a relevant but not the main source of their revenues (and relocation may take
place in other dimensions relevant to patients other than geographic distance).
26





Figure S2.1: Evolution of OTC market structure in Lisbon
NOTES: Panels (a), (b) and (c) convey the location and type of each OTC retailer active in the Lisbon
market as of 2006, 2010, and 2015, respectively. Traditional pharmacies are marked in green, supermarkets
are marked in red and outlets are marked in blue. Because some retailers are located very nearby each other,
the markers might overlap. In total, there were 301 pharmacies, 1 supermarket, and 8 outlets in 2006; 283
pharmacies, 10 supermarkets, and 25 outlets in 2010; and 259 pharmacies, 25 supermarkets, and 21 outlets in
2015.
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S3 Additional tables of results for baseline definitions
of main competitors
29
Remark: The use of a random effects model does not change our basic insights
Table S3.1: Results from estimating equation (1) using random effects
3 nearest neighbors 400-meter radius
(1) (2)
DID estimates:
2010×Supermarket entry before 2006 (θsuper1,2010) -0.026***
(0.008)
2015×Supermarket entry before 2006 (θsuper1,2015) -0.037***
(0.013)
2010×Supermarket entry in 2006/10 (θsuper2,2010) -0.063*** -0.075***
(0.019) (0.015)
2015×Supermarket entry in 2006/10 (θsuper2,2015) -0.063*** -0.038
(0.022) (0.023)
2015×Supermarket entry in 2010/15 (θsuper3,2015) -0.013 -0.024
(0.016) (0.017)
2010×Outlet entry before 2006 (θoutlet1,2010) 0.015 0.023
(0.020) (0.022)
2015×Outlet entry before 2006 (θoutlet1,2015) -0.004 0.022
(0.009) (0.020)
2010×Outlet entry in 2006/10 (θoutlet2,2010) 0.011 -0.005
(0.023) (0.017)
2015×Outlet entry in 2006/10 (θoutlet2,2015) 0.017 0.014
(0.021) (0.019)
2015×Outlet entry in 2010/15 (θoutlet3,2015) 0.001 0.036*
(0.034) (0.021)
Pre-treatment trends:
2010×Supermarket entry in 2010/15 (θsuper3,2010) -0.008 -0.039
(0.027) (0.033)




NOTES: Estimates of θ based on the estimation of equation (1) among pharmacies using random effects.
Columns 1 takes the main competitors of pharmacy i as its 3 nearest neighbors and column 2 considers
all retailers within a 400-meter radius as main competitors. All models include year, drug, parish, and
treatment group fixed-effects. Standard errors shown in parenthesis are clustered at the pharmacy level.
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01.
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Remark: Our results are driven by the most spatially isolated pharmacies
Table S3.2: Results from estimating equation (1) among the most and least spatially isolated
pharmacies in 2006
Most spatially isolated Least spatially isolated
3 nearest neighbors 400-meter radius 3 nearest neighbors 400-meter radius
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DID estimates:
2010×Supermarket entry before 2006 (θsuper1,2010) -0.026**
(0.010)
2015×Supermarket entry before 2006 (θsuper1,2015) -0.033**
(0.015)
2010×Supermarket entry in 2006/10 (θsuper2,2010) -0.071*** -0.099*** -0.058* -0.030***
(0.022) (0.018) (0.030) (0.010)
2015×Supermarket entry in 2006/10 (θsuper2,2015) -0.078*** -0.074*** -0.036* -0.013
(0.018) (0.024) (0.019) (0.009)
2015×Supermarket entry in 2010/15 (θsuper3,2015) -0.033** -0.047 -0.007 -0.010
(0.016) (0.036) (0.025) (0.019)
2010×Outlet entry before 2006 (θoutlet1,2010) 0.008 -0.026 0.013 0.076***
(0.025) (0.021) (0.021) (0.019)
2015×Outlet entry before 2006 (θoutlet1,2015) -0.003 -0.015 -0.010 0.067***
(0.013) (0.015) (0.010) (0.021)
2010×Outlet entry in 2006/10 (θoutlet2,2010) -0.014 -0.054*** 0.030 0.032
(0.026) (0.017) (0.030) (0.021)
2015×Outlet entry in 2006/10 (θoutlet2,2015) 0.006 -0.018 0.003 0.045**
(0.025) (0.031) (0.033) (0.021)
2015×Outlet entry in 2010/15 (θoutlet3,2015) 0.067 0.076* -0.005 0.026
(0.052) (0.039) (0.034) (0.023)
Pre-treatment trends:
2010×Supermarket entry in 2010/15 (θsuper3,2010) -0.041 -0.008 0.017 -0.053
(0.032) (0.020) (0.025) (0.046)
2010×Outlet entry in 2010/15 (θoutlet3,2010) -0.016 -0.005 -0.007 0.020
(0.037) (0.039) (0.019) (0.015)
Observations 1,257 924 1,752 1,287
R2 0.921 0.922 0.918 0.919
NOTES: Estimates of θ based on the estimation of equation (1) among pharmacies located in areas where
market structure is the most and the lest concentrated. Columns 1 and 3 take the main competitors of
pharmacy i as its 3 nearest neighbors and columns 2 and 4 consider all retailers within a 400-meter radius
as main competitors. In columns 1 and 3 the sample was restricted to pharmacies whose walking time (in
minutes) to their 3rd nearest competitor is above and the sample median in 2006, respectively. In columns 2
and 4 the sample was restricted to pharmacies whose number of competitors within a 400-meter radius in 2006
is below and above the sample median, respectively. All models include year, drug, and pharmacy fixed-effects.
Standard errors shown in parenthesis are clustered at the pharmacy level. ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01.
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Remark: Our results are robust to including all retailer types in the estimation
Table S3.3: Results from estimating equation (1) among all retailer types
3 nearest neighbors 400-meter radius
(1) (2)
DID estimates:
2010×Supermarket entry before 2006 (θsuper1,2010) -0.029***
(0.008)
2015×Supermarket entry before 2006 (θsuper1,2015) -0.034**
(0.013)
2010×Supermarket entry in 2006/10 (θsuper2,2010) -0.066*** -0.076***
(0.019) (0.015)
2015×Supermarket entry in 2006/10 (θsuper2,2015) -0.060*** -0.038*
(0.022) (0.023)
2015×Supermarket entry in 2010/15 (θsuper3,2015) -0.011 -0.025
(0.016) (0.017)
2010×Outlet entry before 2006 (θoutlet1,2010) -0.008 0.031
(0.027) (0.022)
2015×Outlet entry before 2006 (θoutlet1,2015) 0.000 0.033*
(0.019) (0.019)
2010×Outlet entry in 2006/10 (θoutlet2,2010) 0.008 -0.006
(0.023) (0.017)
2015×Outlet entry in 2006/10 (θoutlet2,2015) 0.019 0.015
(0.021) (0.020)
2015×Outlet entry in 2010/15 (θoutlet3,2015) 0.003 0.035*
(0.034) (0.021)
Pre-treatment trends:
2010×Supermarket entry in 2010/15 (θsuper3,2010) -0.011 -0.040
(0.027) (0.033)




NOTES: Estimates of θ based on the estimation of equation (1) among all retailer types: traditional pharmacies,
supermarkets and outlets. Column 1 takes the main competitors of retailer i as its 3 nearest neighbors.
Column 2 considers as main competitors of retailer i all retailers located within a 400-meter radius. All
models include year, drug, and retailer fixed-effects. Standard errors shown in parenthesis are clustered at the
retailer level. ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01.
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Remark: Our results are robust to restricting the estimation to pharmacies
whose competitors are all in the control group
Table S3.4: Results from estimating equation (1) among pharmacies whose competitors are
all in the control group
3 nearest neighbors 400-meter radius
(1) (2)
DID estimates:
2010×Supermarket entry before 2006 (θsuper1,2010) -0.026***
(0.009)
2015×Supermarket entry before 2006 (θsuper1,2015) -0.038***
(0.014)
2010×Supermarket entry in 2006/10 (θsuper2,2010) -0.049** -0.073***
(0.020) (0.015)
2015×Supermarket entry in 2006/10 (θsuper2,2015) -0.058*** -0.037
(0.020) (0.023)
2015×Supermarket entry in 2010/15 (θsuper3,2015) -0.015 -0.024
(0.017) (0.018)
2010×Outlet entry before 2006 (θoutlet1,2010) -0.006 0.034
(0.025) (0.022)
2015×Outlet entry before 2006 (θoutlet1,2015) 0.000 0.034*
(0.022) (0.019)
2010×Outlet entry in 2006/10 (θoutlet2,2010) 0.011 -0.003
(0.023) (0.017)
2015×Outlet entry in 2006/10 (θoutlet2,2015) 0.015 0.017
(0.021) (0.020)
2015×Outlet entry in 2010/15 (θoutlet3,2015) -0.001 0.0.37*
(0.028) (0.021)
Pre-treatment trends:
2010×Supermarket entry in 2010/15 (θsuper3,2010) -0.022 0.014
(0.023) (0.015)




NOTES: Estimates of θ based on the estimation of equation (1) among pharmacies whose competi-
tors are all in the control group. Column 1 takes the main competitors of pharmacy i as its 3 nearest
neighbors. Column 2 considers as main competitors of pharmacy i all retailers located within
a 400-meter radius. All models include year, drug, and pharmacy fixed-effects. Standard errors
shown in parenthesis are clustered at the pharmacy level. ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01.
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Remark: Our results are robust to restricting the estimation to a balanced
panel of pharmacies
Table S3.5: Results from estimating equation (1) in a balanced panel of pharmacies
3 nearest neighbors 400-meter radius
(1) (2)
DID estimates:
2010×Supermarket entry before 2006 (θsuper1,2010) -0.022***
(0.008)
2015×Supermarket entry before 2006 (θsuper1,2015) -0.037***
(0.013)
2010×Supermarket entry in 2006/10 (θsuper2,2010) -0.046** -0.071***
(0.020) (0.015)
2015×Supermarket entry in 2006/10 (θsuper2,2015) -0.057*** -0.035
(0.020) (0.023)
2015×Supermarket entry in 2010/15 (θsuper3,2015) -0.011 -0.021
(0.017) (0.019)
2010×Outlet entry before 2006 (θoutlet1,2010) -0.005 0.039
(0.025) (0.025)
2015×Outlet entry before 2006 (θoutlet1,2015) 0.000 0.038*
(0.021) (0.021)
2010×Outlet entry in 2006/10 (θoutlet2,2010) 0.014 -0.011
(0.023) (0.018)
2015×Outlet entry in 2006/10 (θoutlet2,2015) 0.016 0.014
(0.021) (0.020)
2015×Outlet entry in 2010/15 (θoutlet3,2015) -0.000 0.038*
(0.028) (0.021)
Pre-treatment trends:
2010×Supermarket entry in 2010/15 (θsuper3,2010) -0.016 -0.037
(0.023) (0.034)




NOTES: Estimates of θ based on the estimation of equation (1) among pharmacies who are observed
at all time periods (2006, 2010, and 2015). Column 1 takes the main competitors of pharmacy i as
its 3 nearest neighbors. Column 2 considers as main competitors of pharmacy i all retailers located
within a 400-meter radius. All models include year, drug, and pharmacy fixed-effects. Standard
errors shown in parenthesis are clustered at the pharmacy level. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
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Remark: Our results are robust to including pharmacies experiencing multiple
treatments in the estimation
Table S3.6: Results from estimating equation (1) with non-mutually exclusive treatments
3 nearest neighbors 400-meter radius
(1) (2)
DID estimates:
2010×Supermarket entry before 2006 (θsuper1,2010) -0.027***
(0.008)
2015×Supermarket entry before 2006 (θsuper1,2015) -0.038***
(0.013)
2010×Supermarket entry in 2006/10 (θsuper2,2010) -0.064*** -0.077***
(0.019) (0.015)
2015×Supermarket entry in 2006/10 (θsuper2,2015) -0.064*** -0.040*
(0.022) (0.023)
2015×Supermarket entry in 2010/15 (θsuper3,2015) -0.018 -0.061***
(0.015) (0.021)
2010×Outlet entry before 2006 (θoutlet1,2010) 0.013 0.030
(0.020) (0.022)
2015×Outlet entry before 2006 (θoutlet1,2015) -0.005 0.031
(0.010) (0.019)
2010×Outlet entry in 2006/10 (θoutlet2,2010) 0.009 -0.007
(0.023) (0.017)
2015×Outlet entry in 2006/10 (θoutlet2,2015) 0.015 0.014
(0.021) (0.020)
2015×Outlet entry in 2010/15 (θoutlet3,2015) -0.004 0.017
(0.031) (0.019)
Pre-treatment trends:
2010×Supermarket entry in 2010/15 (θsuper3,2010) -0.012 -0.053**
(0.024) (0.021)




NOTES: Estimates of θ based on the estimation of equation (1) among pharmacies, without
imposing mutually exclusivity of treatment groups. Column 1 takes the main competitors of
pharmacy i as its 3 nearest neighbors. Column 2 considers as main competitors of pharmacy
i all retailers located within a 400-meter radius. All models include year, drug, and pharmacy
fixed-effects as well as interactions between different treatment groups. Standard errors shown in
parenthesis are clustered at the pharmacy level. ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01.
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Remark: Our results are robust to restricting the estimation to pharmacies
whose main competitors do not exit the market
Table S3.7: Results from estimating equation (1) among pharmacies whose main competitors
do not exit
3 nearest neighbors 400-meter radius
(1) (2)
DID estimates:
2010×Supermarket entry before 2006 (θsuper1,2010) -0.023**
(0.009)
2015×Supermarket entry before 2006 (θsuper1,2015) -0.039***
(0.014)
2010×Supermarket entry in 2006/10 (θsuper2,2010) -0.125*** -0.091***
(0.007) (0.015)
2015×Supermarket entry in 2006/10 (θsuper2,2015) -0.056*** -0.046
(0.008) (0.028)
2015×Supermarket entry in 2010/15 (θsuper3,2015) -0.031** 0.007
(0.015) (0.021)
2010×Outlet entry before 2006 (θoutlet1,2010) 0.055*** 0.042**
(0.007) (0.018)
2015×Outlet entry before 2006 (θoutlet1,2015) -0.013* 0.037*
(0.008) (0.021)
2010×Outlet entry in 2006/10 (θoutlet2,2010) -0.020 -0.011
(0.036) (0.018)
2015×Outlet entry in 2006/10 (θoutlet2,2015) 0.013 0.011
(0.029) (0.021)
2015×Outlet entry in 2010/15 (θoutlet3,2015) -0.059 0.024
(0.046) (0.021)
Pre-treatment trends:
2010×Supermarket entry in 2010/15 (θsuper3,2010) -0.068 -0.027
(0.050) (0.030)




NOTES: Estimates of θ based on the estimation of equation (1) among pharmacies whose main
competitors do not exit the market during the time horizon under analysis. Column 1 takes the
main competitors of pharmacy i as its 3 nearest neighbors. Column 2 considers as main competitors
of pharmacy i all retailers located within a 400-meter radius. All models include year, drug, and
pharmacy fixed-effects. Standard errors shown in parenthesis are clustered at the pharmacy level.
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01.
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Remark: Statistical significance is often lost when estimating our model in a
PS-matched sample using local linear regression
Table S3.8: Results from estimating equation (1) in a PS-matched sample using local linear
regression
3 nearest neighbors 400-meter radius
(1) (2)
DID estimates:
2010×Supermarket entry in 2006/10 (θsuper2,2010) -0.055 -0.053**
(0.056) (0.026)
2015×Supermarket entry in 2006/10 (θsuper2,2015) -0.080* -0.010
(0.048) (0.031)
2015×Supermarket entry in 2010/15 (θsuper3,2015) -0.030 0.008
(0.044) (0.030)
2010×Outlet entry in 2006/10 (θoutlet2,2010) 0.019 0.011
(0.028) (0.024)
2015×Outlet entry in 2006/10 (θoutlet2,2015) -0.001 0.024
(0.050) (0.027)
2015×Outlet entry in 2010/15 (θoutlet3,2015) -0.016 0.060**
(0.066) (0.024)
Pre-treatment trends:
2010×Supermarket entry in 2010/15 (θsuper3,2010) 0.000 0.021
(0.045) (0.025)




NOTES: Estimates of θ based on the estimation of equation (1) in a matched sample of pharmacies in the
treated groups and pharmacies in the control group. Matching was done on propensity scores using local linear
regression. Column 1 takes the main competitors of pharmacy i as its 3 nearest neighbors. Column 2 considers
as main competitors of pharmacy i all retailers located within a 400-meter radius. All models include year,
drug, and pharmacy fixed-effects. Standard errors shown in parenthesis are bootstrapped using 30 repetitions,
drawn cross-sectionally at the pharmacy level in the original sample. ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01.
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Remark: The statistical significance of ou results is robust to using two-way
clustering by drug and pharmacy
Table S3.9: Results from estimating equation (1) with 2-way clustering of standard errors
3 nearest neighbors 400m radius
(1) (2)
DiD estimates:
2010×Supermarket entry before 2006 (θsuper1,2010) -0.027
(0.023)
2015×Supermarket entry before 2006 (θsuper1,2015) -0.038**
(0.015)
2010×Supermarket entry in 2006/10 (θsuper2,2010) -0.064*** -0.076**
(0.012) (0.019)
2015×Supermarket entry in 2006/10 (θsuper2,2015) -0.064*** -0.038**
(0.012) (0.013)
2015×Supermarket entry in 2010/15 (θsuper3,2015) -0.015 -0.025
(0.010) (0.013)
2010×Outlet entry before 2006 (θoutlet1,2010) 0.013 0.031
(0.009) (0.018)
2015×Outlet entry before 2006 (θoutlet1,2015) -0.005 0.033**
(0.005) (0.011)
2010×Outlet entry in 2006/10 (θoutlet2,2010) 0.009 -0.006
(0.022) (0.013)
2015×Outlet entry in 2006/10 (θoutlet2,2015) 0.015 0.015
(0.015) (0.016)
2015×Outlet entry in 2010/15 (θoutlet3,2015) -0.001 0.035
(0.030) (0.019)
Pre-treatment trends:
2010×Supermarket entry in 2010/15 (θsuper3,2010) -0.009 -0.040
(0.024) (0.031)




NOTES: Estimates of θ based on the estimation of equation (1) among traditional pharmacies. In
column 1 the main competitors of pharmacy i are its 3 nearest neighbors. In column 2 the main
competitors of pharmacy i are the retailers located with a 400-meter radius. All specifications
include year, drug, and pharmacy fixed-effects. Standard errors are shown in parenthesis are
clustered at the pharmacy and drug level. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Remark: We find no evidence that experiencing non-pharmacy entry makes
pharmacies more likely to exit the market before the next data collection round
Table S3.10: Does experiencing non-pharmacy entry make pharmacies more likely to exit
next period?
Number of nearest neighbors (N) Radius (R)
4 5 400m 600m 800m
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Supermarket entry before 2006
Supermarket entry in 2006/10 -0.132 -0.033
(0.0123) (0.101)
Outlet entry before 2006 -0.137 0.071 0.006 0.095 0.042
(0.135) (0.130) (0.099) (0.073) (0.096)
Outlet entry in 2006/10 -0.143 -0.109 -0.128 -0.121 -0.145*
(0.111) (0.091) (0.086) (0.085) (0.086)
Observations 380 356 368 328 265
NOTES: Marginal effects from a logit regression of a binary variable equaling 1 for pharmacies that exited
the market before the next round of data collection and 0 otherwise, on treatment group indicators, parish
fixed-effects, and year fixed-effects. Columns 1 and 2 take the main competitors of pharmacy i as its N nearest
neighbors, with N=4 and N=5, respectively. For N=1,2,3 there is not enough variation to estimate the model
because none of pharmacies experiencing non-pharmacy entry among 1,2, and 3 nearest competitors exits
the market. Columns 3, 4, and 5 take all retailers located within a 400, 600, and 800-meter radius as main
competitors of pharmacy i. Regardless of the definition of main competitors used, no pharmacies experiencing
supermarket entry among their main competitors before 2006 exited the market so the corresponding coefficients
cannot be estimated. Similarly, when using N = 4, N = 5, and R = 400, none of the pharmacies that
experienced entry of a supermarket among their main competitors between 2006 and 2010 exited the market
so these coefficients cannot be estimated either. All models include year and parish fixed-effects. Standard
errors shown in parenthesis are clustered at the pharmacy level. ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01.
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S4 Results for other definitions of main competitors
Remark: Enlarging the set of main competitors of a pharmacy (by including a
larger number of nearest neighbors or increasing the radius distance) yields few
statistically significant price effects, suggesting competition in the OTC market
is fairly localized.
Table S4.1: Sample composition for alternative definitions of main competitors
Main competitors Group 2006 2010 2015
Nearest neighbor
Control Group 190 258 234
Supermarket entry before 2006 0 0 0
Supermarket entry in 2006/10 4 4 4
Supermarket entry in 2010/15 4 4 4
Outlet entry before 2006 8 8 8
Outlet entry in 2006/10 10 10 10
Outlet entry in 2010/15 15 15 15
Total 231 299 275
2 nearest neighbors
Control Group 167 235 212
Supermarket entry before 2006 1 1 1
Supermarket entry in 2006/10 3 3 3
Supermarket entry in 2010/15 8 8 8
Outlet entry before 2006 9 9 9
Outlet entry in 2006/10 8 8 8
Outlet entry in 2010/15 9 9 9
Total pharmacies 205 273 250
4 nearest neighbors
Control Group 138 207 185
Supermarket entry before 2006 3 3 3
Supermarket entry in 2006/10 5 5 5
Supermarket entry in 2010/15 19 19 19
Outlet entry before 2006 13 12 12
Outlet entry in 2006/10 10 10 9
Outlet entry in 2010/15 18 18 18
Total pharmacies 206 274 251
Continued on next page
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Table S4.1 – Continued from previous page
Main competitors Group 2006 2010 2015
5 nearest neighbors
Control Group 109 179 159
Supermarket entry before 2006 0 0 0
Supermarket entry in 2006/10 5 5 5
Supermarket entry in 2010/15 18 18 18
Outlet entry before 2006 10 8 7
Outlet entry in 2006/10 14 14 12
Outlet entry in 2010/15 18 18 18
Total pharmacies 174 242 219
600m radius
Control Group 94 166 150
Supermarket entry before 2006 1 1 1
Supermarket entry in 2006/10 9 9 8
Supermarket entry in 2010/15 12 12 12
Outlet entry before 2006 13 9 7
Outlet entry in 2006/10 17 17 14
Outlet entry in 2010/15 12 12 12
Total pharmacies 158 226 204
800m radius
Control Group 68 141 129
Supermarket entry before 2006 0 0 0
Supermarket entry in 2006/10 9 9 7
Supermarket entry in 2010/15 8 8 8
Outlet entry before 2006 12 7 6
Outlet entry in 2006/10 21 21 18
Outlet entry in 2010/15 10 10 10
Total pharmacies 128 196 178
NOTES: The table shows the number of pharmacies included in the estimation sample, for
alternative definitions of main competitors of a pharmacy: the N nearest neighbors with
N=1,2,4,5 in the top four panels, and the retailers located within a radius R of 600 and 800
meters in the two bottom panels. The lower number of pharmacies in the control group in
2006 is a consequence of missing price data for that year, as discussed in Section 3. In addition,
the number of pharmacies used in the estimation sample changes with the definition of main
competitors because we are focusing on samples of pharmacies for which each treatment is
mutually exclusive. Thus, a longer radius (or more nearest neighbors) means higher chances
that a pharmacy falls into more than one treatment group and is excluded from the analysis.
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Table S4.2: Testing for differences at baseline for alternative definitions of main competitors
Variable Control Eventually Treated Difference P-value
Main competitors: nearest neighbor
Price Aspirina 500mg (e ) 3.041 2.873 0.167* 0.018
Price Cêgripe (e ) 4.292 4.273 0.019 0.745
Price Trifene200 (e ) 3.326 3.271 0.055 0.428
Price Mebocáına Forte (e ) 4.664 4.582 0.082 0.295
Price Tantum Verde (e ) 4.970 4.864 0.107 0.309
Avg distance to nearest neighbor (km) 0.309 0.434 -0.125* 0.059
Avg time to nearest neighbor (min) 3.729 5.077 -1.348 0.120
Population in census block (as of 2001) 609.516 698.308 -88.792 0.124
Main competitors: 2 nearest neighbors
Price Aspirina 500mg (e ) 3.030 3.045 -0.015 0.772
Price Cêgripe (e ) 4.302 4.273 0.019 0.745
Price Trifene200 (e ) 3.336 3.268 0.069 0.167
Price Mebocáına Forte (e ) 4.663 4.635 0.028* 0.062
Price Tantum Verde (e ) 4.972 4.899 0.073 0.037
Avg distance to 2 nearest neighbors (km) 0.154 0.188 -0.034 0.142
Avg time to 2 nearest neighbors (min) 4.406 5.357 -0.951 0.128
Population in census block (as of 2001) 598.024 723.286 -125.262*** 0.002
Main competitors: 4 nearest neighbors
Price Aspirina 500mg (e ) 3.036 2.997 0.040 0.321
Price Cêgripe (e ) 4.314 4.224 0.089** 0.013
Price Trifene200 (e ) 3.415 3.307 0.035 0.411
Price Mebocáına Forte (e ) 4.671 4.667 0.004 0.931
Price Tantum Verde (e ) 4.979 4.918 0.061 0.356
Avg distance to 4 nearest neighbors (km) 0.311 0.323 -0.012 0.717
Avg time to 4 nearest neighbors (min) 5.796 5.860 -0.064 0.920
Population in census block (as of 2001) 591.058 662.233 -71.175** 0.040
Continued on next page
42
Table S4.2 – Continued from previous page
Variable Control Eventually Treated Difference P-value
Main competitors: 5 nearest neighbors
Price Aspirina 500mg (e ) 3.033 3.013 0.020 0.588
Price Cêgripe (e ) 4.325 4.260 0.065* 0.063
Price Trifene200 (e ) 3.340 3.326 0.014 0.732
Price Mebocáına Forte (e ) 4.681 4.697 -0.015 0.725
Price Tantum Verde (e ) 4.993 4.940 0.053 0.418
Avg distance to 5 nearest neighbors (km) 0.510 0.512 -0.002 0.966
Avg time to 5 nearest neighbors (min) 6.385 6.249 0.136 0.836
Population in census block (as of 2001) 588.156 618.763 -30.608 0.340
Main competitors: 600-meter radius
Price Aspirina 500mg (e ) 3.022 3.019 0.002 0.958
Price Cêgripe (e ) 4.321 4.238 0.084* 0.052
Price Trifene200 (e ) 3.337 3.299 0.039 0.382
Price Mebocáına Forte (e ) 4.666 4.678 -0.012 0.811
Price Tantum Verde (e ) 4.987 4.915 0.072 0.308
Number of retailers within radius 10.376 7.108 3.268*** 0.002
Population in Census section (as of 2001) 594.101 651.243 -57.142 0.142
Main competitors: 800-meter radius
Price Aspirina 500mg (e ) 3.008 3.027 0.019 0.688
Price Cêgripe (e ) 4.310 4.253 0.057 0.224
Price Trifene200 (e ) 3.324 3.306 0.018 0.697
Price Mebocáına Forte (e ) 4.657 4.673 -0.016 0.761
Price Tantum Verde (e ) 4.977 4.884 0.093 0.244
Number of retailers within radius 14.153 10.448 3.705** 0.010
Population in Census section (as of 2001) 588.329 653.103 -64.774 0.151
NOTES: The table conveys the mean of several variables of interest in 2006 for several alternative definitions
of main competitors. In the top four panels, the main competitors of a pharmacy are its N nearest neighbors,
with N=1,2,4,5, respectively. In the two bottom panels, the main competitors of a pharmacy are all retailers
located inside a 600 and 800-meter radius, respectively. For each panel, the first column reports averages
across pharmacies belonging to the control group. The second column reports averages across pharmacies
which were not yet treated in 2006, but will eventually face the entry of a non-pharmacy amongst their main
competitors, thus grouping together pharmacies facing the entry of a supermarket or an outlet either between
2006 and 2010, or between 2010 and 2015. Pharmacies already treated in 2006 is not accounted for in this
table because they are not observed prior to treatment. Column 3 computes the difference of columns 1 and
2, and column 4 shows the corresponding two-sided p-value.
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Table S4.3: Results from estimating equation (1) with alternative definitions of main com-
petitors
Number of nearest neighbors Radius
1 2 4 5 600m 800m
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DID estimates:
2010×Supermarket entry before 2006 (θsuper1,2010) -0.038*** -0.037*** -0.036***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.007)
2015×Supermarket entry before 2006 (θsuper1,2015) -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.020***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.008)
2010×Supermarket entry in 2006/10 (θsuper2,2010) -0.063** -0.094*** -0.082*** -0.049 -0.022 -0.037
(0.027) (0.016) (0.023) (0.031) (0.026) (0.032)
2015×Supermarket entry in 2006/10 (θsuper2,2015) -0.062** -0.095*** -0.050* -0.044* -0.038* -0.030
(0.028) (0.017) (0.028) (0.032) (0.020) (0.023)
2015×Supermarket entry in 2010/15 (θsuper3,2015) -0.035* -0.037*** 0.029 -0.028** -0.010 -0.045*
(0.020) (0.012) (0.018) (0.015) (0.021) (0.023)
2010×Outlet entry before 2006 (θoutlet1,2010) 0.007 -0.016 0.044** 0.046*** 0.014 -0.024
(0.016) (0.024) (0.018) (0.014) (0.021) (0.022)
2015×Outlet entry before 2006 (θoutlet1,2015) 0.001 -0.025 0.008 0.016 0.030 0.029
(0.019) (0.023) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.036)
2010×Outlet entry in 2006/10 (θoutlet2,2010) -0.017** -0.034 -0.015 -0.005 -0.002 0.007
(0.007) (0.023) (0.029) (0.025) (0.018) (0.016)
2015×Outlet entry in 2006/10 (θoutlet2,2015) 0.031*** -0.027 -0.001 0.028 0.012 0.009
(0.005) (0.020) (0.024) (0.020) (0.018) (0.015)
2015×Outlet entry in 2010/15 (θoutlet3,2015) 0.003 -0.014 -0.018 -0.004 0.005 -0.007
(0.053) (0.033) (0.024) (0.019) (0.022) (0.022)
Pre-treatment trends:
2010×Supermarket entry in 2010/15 (θsuper3,2010) -0.022 -0.026 -0.027 -0.027 0.002 -0.038
(0.022) (0.026) (0.023) (0.019) (0.029) (0.033)
2010×Outlet entry in 2010/15 (θoutlet3,2010) -0.053*** -0.017 -0.003 -0.000 -0.000 -0.012
(0.020) (0.018) (0.012) (0.011) (0.017) (0.016)
Observations 3,709 3,624 3,309 3,160 2,925 2,497
R2 0.910 0.911 0.912 0.913 0.911 0.914
NOTES: Estimates of θ based on the estimation of equation (1) using alternative measures of main competitors.
Columns 1 to 4 take the main competitors of pharmacy i as its N nearest neighbors, with N = 1, 2, 4, 5,
respectively. Columns 5 and 6 consider all retailers located within a radius of 600 and 800 meters, respectively,
as main competitors. All models include year, drug, and pharmacy fixed-effects. Standard errors shown in
parenthesis are clustered at the pharmacy level. ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01.
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Table S4.4: Results from estimating equation (1) among the most spatially isolated pharmacies
in 2006
Number of nearest neighbors Radius
1 2 4 5 600m 800m
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DID estimates:
2010×Supermarket entry before 2006 (θsuper1,2010) -0.032*** -0.034*** -0.042***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
2015×Supermarket entry before 2006 (θsuper1,2015) -0.025*** -0.020* -0.027**
(0.008) (0.010) (0.011)
2010×Supermarket entry in 2006/10 (θsuper2,2010) -0.070*** -0.102*** -0.059** -0.058**
(0.009) (0.020) (0.027) (0.027)
2015×Supermarket entry in 2006/10 (θsuper2,2015) -0.058** -0.116*** -0.077*** -0.55* -0.049** -0.043**
(0.028) (0.010) (0.021) (0.032) (0.022) (0.019)
2015×Supermarket entry in 2010/15 (θsuper3,2015) -0.061** -0.045*** -0.029* -0.056** -0.038 0.040*
(0.029) (0.016) (0.016) (0.025) (0.034) (0.023)
2010×Outlet entry before 2006 (θoutlet1,2010) -0.029 0.035*** 0.028** -0.055** -0.006 0.030*
(0.027) (0.013) (0.014) (0.025) (0.030) (0.018)
2015×Outlet entry before 2006 (θoutlet1,2015) 0.037** 0.019 -0.012 0.031** -0.027** 0.096
(0.016) (0.031) (0.016) (0.013) (0.013) (0.062)
2010×Outlet entry in 2006/10 (θoutlet2,2010) 0.032 -0.025 -0.023 -0.005 -0.050** 0.001
(0.040) (0.026) (0.028) (0.034) (0.023) (0.028)
2015×Outlet entry in 2006/10 (θoutlet2,2015) -0.012 -0.015 -0.006 0.023 -0.017 0.028
(0.009) (0.024) (0.027) (0.031) (0.025) (0.022)
2015×Outlet entry in 2010/15 (θoutlet3,2015) 0.131*** 0.059 -0.093*** -0.067* 0.020 -0.070
(0.009) (0.052) (0.026) (0.035) (0.077) (0.047)
Pre-treatment trends:
2010×Supermarket entry in 2010/15 (θsuper3,2010) -0.040*** -0.035 -0.040 -0.050 -0.050 -0.033
(0.012) (0.037) (0.028) (0.047) (0.064) (0.042)
2010×Outlet entry in 2010/15 (θoutlet3,2010) -0.091*** -0.014 -0.010 -0.032 -0.034 -0.035***
(0.008) (0.037) (0.009) (0.032) (0.056) (0.012)
Observations 1,288 1,292 1,137 903 933 733
R2 0.916 0.919 0.921 0.921 0.914 0.922
NOTES: Estimates of θ based on the estimation of equation (1) among pharmacies located in areas where
market structure is the most concentrated (ie. closest to a monopoly). Columns 1 to 4 take the main
competitors of pharmacy i as its N nearest neighbors, with N = 1, 2, 4, 5, respectively. Columns 5 and 6
consider all retailers located within a radius of 600 and 800 meters, respectively, as main competitors. In
columns 1 to 4 the samples were restricted to pharmacies whose walking time (in minutes) to their Nth
nearest neighbor is above the sample mean in 2006. In columns 5 and 6 the samples were restricted to
pharmacies whose number of competitors within the relevant radius in 2006 is below the sample median for
the relevant radius distance. All models include year, drug, and pharmacy fixed-effects. Standard errors
shown in parenthesis are clustered at the pharmacy level. ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01.
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Table S4.5: Results from estimating equation (1) among the least spatially isolated pharmacies
in 2006
Number of nearest neighbors Radius
1 2 4 5 600m 800m
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DID estimates:
2010×Supermarket entry before 2006 (θsuper1,2010)
2015×Supermarket entry before 2006 (θsuper1,2015)
2010×Supermarket entry in 2006/10 (θsuper2,2010) -0.086** 0.040 0.008
(0.034) (0.036) (0.074)
2015×Supermarket entry in 2006/10 (θsuper2,2015) -0.028 -0.044 0.015
(0.025) (0.038) (0.038)
2015×Supermarket entry in 2010/15 (θsuper3,2015) -0.048*** -0.031 -0.032 -0.019 -0.025 -0.056
(0.009) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.031) (0.050)
2010×Outlet entry before 2006 (θoutlet1,2010) -0.036* -0.041 0.047** 0.065*** 0.025 -0.023
(0.018) (0.032) (0.020) (0.021) (0.033) (0.023)
2015×Outlet entry before 2006 (θoutlet1,2015) -0.004 -0.053** 0.013 0.050* 0.062*** 0.019
(0.009) (0.021) (0.023) (0.026) (0.019) (0.038)
2010×Outlet entry in 2006/10 (θoutlet2,2010) -0.057 -0.011 0.018 0.042* 0.009
(0.036) (0.042) (0.031) (0.024) (0.021)
2015×Outlet entry in 2006/10 (θoutlet2,2015) -0.078*** -0.018 0.043* 0.037 -0.014
(0.019) (0.035) (0.024) (0.026) (0.022)
2015×Outlet entry in 2010/15 (θoutlet3,2015) -0.072*** -0.054 -0.023 0.001 0.001 0.008
(0.009) (0.034) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024)
Pre-treatment trends:
2010×Supermarket entry in 2010/15 (θsuper3,2010) 0.053*** 0.026* -0.021 0.018 0.003 -0.042
(0.009) (0.013) (0.021) (0.025) (0.040) (0.055)
2010×Outlet entry in 2010/15 (θoutlet3,2010) -0.013 -0.018 -0.005 0.006 0.008 0.012
(0.009) (0.020) (0.012) (0.015) (0.020) (0.020)
Observations 1,102 1,497 1,856 1,099 924 760
R2 0.908 0.915 0.919 0.919 0.925 0.926
NOTES: Estimates of θ based on the estimation of equation (1) among pharmacies located in areas where
market structure is the least concentrated (ie. furthest from a monopoly). Columns 1 to 4 take the main
competitors of pharmacy i as its N nearest neighbors, with N = 1, 2, 4, 5, respectively. Columns 5 and 6
consider all retailers located within a radius of 600 and 800 meters, respectively, as main competitors. In
columns 1 to 4 the samples were restricted to pharmacies whose walking time (in minutes) to their Nth
nearest neighbor is below the sample mean in 2006. In columns 5 and 6 the samples were restricted to
pharmacies whose number of competitors within the relevant radius in 2006 is above the sample median for
the relevant radius distance. All models include year, drug, and pharmacy fixed-effects. Standard errors
shown in parenthesis are clustered at the pharmacy level. ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01.
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Table S4.6: Results from estimating equation (1) among all retailer types
Number of nearest neighbors Radius
1 2 4 5 600m 800m
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DID estimates:
2010×Supermarket entry before 2006 (θsuper1,2010) -0.039*** -0.041*** -0.036***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
2015×Supermarket entry before 2006 (θsuper1,2015) -0.020*** -0.022*** -0.020***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.008)
2010×Supermarket entry in 2006/10 (θsuper2,2010) -0.064** -0.096*** -0.123*** -0.053* -0.022 -0.037
(0.027) (0.016) (0.037) (0.031) (0.026) (0.032)
2015×Supermarket entry in 2006/10 (θsuper2,2015) -0.058** -0.092*** -0.107* -0.042* -0.038* -0.030
(0.028) (0.017) (0.056) (0.023) (0.020) (0.023)
2015×Supermarket entry in 2010/15 (θsuper3,2015) -0.032 -0.034*** -0.027 -0.026* -0.010 -0.045*
(0.021) (0.012) (0.018) (0.015) (0.021) (0.023)
2010×Outlet entry before 2006 (θoutlet1,2010) 0.006 -0.025 0.012 0.043*** 0.014 -0.024
(0.016) (0.024) (0.030) (0.014) (0.021) (0.022)
2015×Outlet entry before 2006 (θoutlet1,2015) 0.004 -0.018 -0.004 0.018 0.030 0.029
(0.019) (0.023) (0.024) (0.020) (0.021) (0.036)
2010×Outlet entry in 2006/10 (θoutlet2,2010) -0.003 -0.029 -0.019 -0.004 -0.002 0.007
(0.014) (0.021) (0.029) (0.024) (0.018) (0.016)
2015×Outlet entry in 2006/10 (θoutlet2,2015) 0.041*** -0.020 0.001 0.032* 0.012 0.009
(0.009) (0.020) (0.024) (0.019) (0.018) (0.015)
2015×Outlet entry in 2010/15 (θoutlet3,2015) 0.006 -0.010 -0.016 -0.002 0.005 -0.007
(0.053) (0.033) (0.024) (0.020) (0.022) (0.022)
Pre-treatment trends:
2010×Supermarket entry in 2010/15 (θsuper3,2010) -0.023 -0.027 -0.031 -0.030 -0.000 -0.038
(0.022) (0.026) (0.023) (0.019) (0.017) (0.033)
2010×Outlet entry in 2010/15 (θoutlet3,2010) -0.054*** -0.018 -0.006 -0.004 0.008 -0.012
(0.020) (0.018) (0.012) (0.012) (0.020) (0.016)
Observations 4,141 4,056 3,716 3,542 2,925 2,497
R2 0.904 0.904 0.905 0.906 0.911 0.914
NOTES: Estimates of θ based on the estimation of equation (1) among all retailer types: traditional pharmacies,
supermarkets and outlets. Columns 1 to 4 take the main competitors of pharmacy i as its N nearest neighbors,
with N = 1, 2, 4, 5, respectively. Columns 5 and 6 consider all retailers located within a radius of 600 and
800 meters, respectively, as main competitors. All models include year, drug, and pharmacy fixed-effects.
Standard errors shown in parenthesis are clustered at the retailer level. ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01.
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Table S4.7: Results from estimating equation (1) among pharmacies whose competitors are
all in the control group
Number of nearest neighbors Radius
1 2 4 5 600m 800m
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DID estimates:
2010×Supermarket entry before 2006 (θsuper1,2010) -0.036*** -0.054*** -0.030***
(0.006) (0.019) (0.009)
2015×Supermarket entry before 2006 (θsuper1,2015) -0.022*** -0.033* -0.022**
(0.006) (0.018) (0.010)
2010×Supermarket entry in 2006/10 (θsuper2,2010) -0.064** -0.093*** -0.059*** -0.048 -0.017 -0.038
(0.027) (0.017) (0.022) (0.032) (0.026) (0.034)
2015×Supermarket entry in 2006/10 (θsuper2,2015) -0.063** -0.094*** -0.057** -0.048** -0.040* -0.034
(0.028) (0.018) (0.025) (0.024) (0.021) (0.026)
2015×Supermarket entry in 2010/15 (θsuper3,2015) -0.037* -0.036*** -0.005 -0.031** -0.012 -0.049*
(0.021) (0.013) (0.020) (0.016) (0.022) (0.026)
2010×Outlet entry before 2006 (θoutlet1,2010) 0.006 -0.015 0.024 0.047*** 0.020 -0.025
(0.016) (0.024) (0.021) (0.016) (0.021) (0.024)
2015×Outlet entry before 2006 (θoutlet1,2015) -0.001 -0.024 0.010 0.013 0.028 0.025
(0.019) (0.023) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.038)
2010×Outlet entry in 2006/10 (θoutlet2,2010) -0.018** -0.033 -0.012 -0.004 0.004 0.006
(0.007) (0.023) (0.030) (0.025) (0.019) (0.020)
2015×Outlet entry in 2006/10 (θoutlet2,2015) 0.029*** -0.025 0.003 0.024 0.010 0.005
(0.006) (0.021) (0.024) (0.025) (0.018) (0.020)
2015×Outlet entry in 2010/15 (θoutlet3,2015) 0.001 -0.013 0.001 -0.008 0.003 -0.013
(0.053) (0.034) (0.020) (0.020) (0.022) (0.020)
Pre-treatment trends:
2010×Supermarket entry in 2010/15 (θsuper3,2010) -0.023 -0.025 -0.025 -0.025 0.008 -0.039
(0.022) (0.026) (0.015) (0.015) (0.029) (0.035)
2010×Outlet entry in 2010/15 (θoutlet3,2010) -0.053*** -0.015 0.001 0.001 0.006 0.005
(0.020) (0.018) (0.013) (0.013) (0.018) (0.020)
Observations 3,246 2,849 1,858 1,712 1,875 1,486
R2 0.911 0.910 0.912 0.918 0.913 0.909
NOTES: Estimates of θ based on the estimation of equation (1) among pharmacies whose competitors are all
in the control group. Columns 1 to 4 take the main competitors of pharmacy i as its N nearest neighbors,
with N = 1, 2, 4, 5, respectively. Columns 5 and 6 consider all retailers located within a radius of 600 and
800 meters, respectively, as main competitors. All models include year, drug, and pharmacy fixed-effects.
Standard errors shown in parenthesis are clustered at the pharmacy level. ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01.
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Table S4.8: Results from estimating equation (1) in a balanced panel of pharmacies
Number of nearest neighbors Radius
1 2 4 5 600m 800m
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DID estimates:
2010×Supermarket entry before 2006 (θsuper1,2010) -0.034*** -0.052*** -0.031***
(0.005) (0.019) (0.007)
2015×Supermarket entry before 2006 (θsuper1,2015) -0.023*** 0.033* -0.019**
(0.006) (0.018) (0.009)
2010×Supermarket entry in 2006/10 (θsuper2,2010) -0.060** -0.090*** -0.057*** -0.041 -0.035 -0.033
(0.027) (0.016) (0.021) (0.031) (0.022) (0.029)
2015×Supermarket entry in 2006/10 (θsuper2,2015) -0.060** -0.095*** -0.057** -0.041* -0.045** -0.029
(0.028) (0.018) (0.024) (0.024) (0.018) (0.021)
2015×Supermarket entry in 2010/15 (θsuper3,2015) -0.034* -0.034*** -0.004 -0.023 -0.017 -0.044*
(0.021) (0.012) (0.019) (0.015) (0.021) (0.023)
2010×Outlet entry before 2006 (θoutlet1,2010) 0.010 -0.013 0.025 0.054*** 0.032 -0.008
(0.016) (0.024) (0.021) (0.016) (0.022) (0.023)
2015×Outlet entry before 2006 (θoutlet1,2015) 0.002 -0.024 0.008 0.019 0.037* 0.035
(0.019) (0.023) (0.021) (0.021) (0.037)
2010×Outlet entry in 2006/10 (θoutlet2,2010) -0.014* -0.031 0.010 0.027 -0.012 -0.000
(0.007) (0.023) (0.025) (0.021) (0.019) (0.016)
2015×Outlet entry in 2006/10 (θoutlet2,2015) 0.032*** -0.026 0.013 0.043** 0.006 0.003
(0.006) (0.021) (0.023) (0.019) (0.018) (0.015)
2015×Outlet entry in 2010/15 (θoutlet3,2015) 0.005 -0.013 0.001 -0.001 0.006 -0.006
(0.053) (0.033) (0.022) (0.020) (0.022) (0.022)
Pre-treatment trends:
2010×Supermarket entry in 2010/15 (θsuper3,2010) -0.019 -0.018 -0.030 -0.017 0.000 -0.031
(0.022) (0.026) (0.019) (0.020) (0.028) (0.034)
2010×Outlet entry in 2010/15 (θoutlet3,2010) -0.049** -0.013 0.009 0.009 0.005 -0.005
(0.020) (0.018) (0.012) (0.012) (0.017) (0.016)
Observations 2,460 2,385 2,235 1,923 1,698 1,314
R2 0.912 0.920 0.921 0.924 0.922 0.928
NOTES: Estimates of θ based on the estimation of equation (1) among pharmacies who are observed at all
time periods (2006, 2010, 2015). Columns 1 to 4 take the main competitors of pharmacy i as its N nearest
neighbors, with N = 1, 2, 4, 5, respectively. Columns 5 and 6 consider all retailers located within a radius of 600
and 800 meters, respectively, as main competitors. All models include year, drug, and pharmacy fixed-effects.
Standard errors shown in parenthesis are clustered at the pharmacy level. ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01.
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Table S4.9: Results from estimating equation (1) among pharmacies whose main competitors
did not exit
Number of nearest neighbors Radius
1 2 4 5 600m 800m
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DID estimates:
2010×Supermarket entry before 2006 (θsuper1,2010) -0.035*** -0.032***
(0.006) (0.008)
2015×Supermarket entry before 2006 (θsuper1,2015) -0.024*** -0.024***
(0.006) (0.007)
2010×Supermarket entry in 2006/10 (θsuper2,2010) -0.060* -0.103*** -0.126*** -0.040 -0.023 -0.039
(0.036) (0.019) (0.008) (0.038) (0.026) (0.032)
2015×Supermarket entry in 2006/10 (θsuper2,2015) -0.041 -0.082*** -0.057*** -0.027 -0.039* -0.031
(0.030) (0.019) (0.007) (0.024) (0.020) (0.023)
2015×Supermarket entry in 2010/15 (θsuper3,2015) -0.034* -0.040*** -0.050* -0.049* -0.017 -0.060**
(0.021) (0.014) (0.027) (0.026) (0.022) (0.023)
2010×Outlet entry before 2006 (θoutlet1,2010) 0.011 0.046*** 0.027 -0.025
(0.031) (0.014) (0.021) (0.022)
2015×Outlet entry before 2006 (θoutlet1,2015) -0.028 -0.045** 0.043** 0.028
(0.017) (0.023) (0.020) (0.036)
2010×Outlet entry in 2006/10 (θoutlet2,2010) -0.016** -0.055* -0.022 0.028 -0.003 0.005
(0.007) (0.031) (0.036) (0.030) (0.018) (0.016)
2015×Outlet entry in 2006/10 (θoutlet2,2015) 0.032*** -0.010 0.012 0.055*** 0.010 0.008
(0.006) (0.029) (0.029) (0.021) (0.018) (0.015)
2015×Outlet entry in 2010/15 (θoutlet3,2015) 0.004 -0.022 -0.005 0.017 -0.008 -0.022
(0.053) (0.047) (0.036) (0.031) (0.021) (0.019)
Pre-treatment trends:
2010×Treated with supermarket in 201015 -0.021 -0.042 -0.070** -0.081*** -0.006 -0.053
(0.022) (0.046) (0.029) (0.029) (0.030) (0.033)
2010×Outlet entry in 2010/15 (θoutlet3,2010) -0.052*** -0.025 -0.010 0.001 -0.005 -0.018
(0.020) (0.020) (0.013) (0.016) (0.018) (0.017)
Observations 3,099 2,448 1,532 1,242 2,675 2,412
R2 0.910 0.911 0.917 0.918 0.910 0.915
NOTES: Estimates of θ based on the estimation of equation (1) among pharmacies whose main competitors
do not exit the market during the time horizon under analysis. Columns 1 to 4 take the main competitors of
pharmacy i as its N nearest neighbors, with N = 1, 2, 4, 5, respectively. Columns 5 and 6 consider all retailers
located within a radius of 600 and 800 meters, respectively, as main competitors. All models include year,
drug, and pharmacy fixed-effects. Standard errors shown in parenthesis are clustered at the pharmacy level.
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01.
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Table S4.10: Results from estimating equation (1) with non-mutually exclusive treatments
Number of nearest neighbors Radius
1 2 4 5 600m 800m
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DID estimates:
2010×Supermarket entry before 2006 (θsuper1,2010) -0.038*** -0.036*** -0.032 -0.037*** -0.052***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.024) (0.007) (0.014)
2015×Supermarket entry before 2006 (θsuper1,2015) -0.023*** -0.021*** -0.049*** -0.021*** -0.038***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.019) (0.008) (0.013)
2010×Supermarket entry in 2006/10 (θsuper2,2010) -0.063** -0.094*** -0.081*** -0.048 -0.023 -0.037
(0.027) (0.016) (0.023) (0.031) (0.026) (0.032)
2015×Supermarket entry in 2006/10 (θsuper2,2015) -0.062** -0.095*** -0.048* -0.041* -0.038* -0.029
(0.028) (0.017) (0.028) (0.023) (0.020) (0.023)
2015×Supermarket entry in 2010/15 (θsuper3,2015) -0.035* -0.037*** -0.008 0.010 -0.013 -0.040*
(0.020) (0.012) (0.020) (0.015) (0.018) (0.022)
2010×Outlet entry before 2006 (θoutlet1,2010) 0.007 -0.016 0.044** 0.048*** 0.013 -0.023
(0.016) (0.024) (0.018) (0.014) (0.021) (0.022)
2015×Outlet entry before 2006 (θoutlet1,2015) 0.001 -0.025 0.010 0.019 0.029 0.030
(0.019) (0.023) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.036)
2010×Outlet entry in 2006/10 (θoutlet2,2010) -0.017** -0.034 -0.015 -0.004 -0.003 0.007
(0.007) (0.023) (0.029) (0.025) (0.018) (0.016)
2015×Outlet entry in 2006/10 (θoutlet2,2015) 0.031*** -0.027 0.001 0.031 0.012 0.010
(0.005) (0.020) (0.024) (0.020) (0.017) (0.015)
2015×Outlet entry in 2010/15 (θoutlet3,2015) 0.003 -0.014 0.001 0.014 0.002 -0.003
(0.053) (0.033) (0.023) (0.018) (0.019) (0.020)
Pre-treatment trends:
2010×Supermarket entry in 2010/15 (θsuper3,2010) -0.022 -0.026 -0.027 -0.022 -0.007 -0.034
(0.022) (0.026) (0.020) (0.017) (0.021) (0.023)
2010×Outlet entry in 2010/15 (θoutlet3,2010) -0.053*** -0.014 -0.003 0.004 -0.009 -0.008
(0.020) (0.033) (0.012) (0.012) (0.016) (0.017)
Observations 3,769 3,769 3,769 3,769 3,769 3,769
R2 0.908 0.909 0.909 0.909 0.909 0.909
NOTES: Estimates of θ based on the estimation of equation (1) among pharmacies, without imposing mutually
exclusivity of treatment groups. Columns 1 to 4 take the main competitors of pharmacy i as its N nearest
neighbors, with N = 1, 2, 4, 5, respectively. Columns 5 and 6 consider all retailers located within a radius
of 600 and 800 meters, respectively, as main competitors. All models include year, drug, and pharmacy
fixed-effects as well as interactions between different treatment groups. Standard errors shown in parenthesis
are clustered at the pharmacy level. ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01.
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Table S4.11: Results from estimating equation (1) with 2-way clustering of standard errors by
drug and pharmacy
Number of nearest neighbors (N) Radius
1 2 4 5 600m 800m
DiD estimates:
2010×Supermarket entry before 2006 (θsuper1,2010) -0.038** -0.037** -0.036**
(0.010) (0.011) (0.010)
2015×Supermarket entry before 2006 (θsuper1,2015) -0.023 -0.023 -0.020
(0.027) (0.028) (0.030)
2010×Supermarket entry in 2006/10 (θsuper2,2010) -0.063** -0.094*** -0.082*** -0.049 -0.022 -0.037
(0.017) (0.015) (0.018) (0.027) (0.026) (0.029)
2015×Supermarket entry in 2006/10 (θsuper2,2015) -0.062** -0.095*** -0.050 -0.044** -0.038** -0.030*
(0.016) (0.007) (0.024) (0.011) (0.009) (0.013)
2015×Supermarket entry in 2010/15 (θsuper3,2015) -0.035 -0.037*** -0.029** -0.028* -0.010 -0.045**
(0.040) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.016) (0.016)
2010×Outlet entry before 2006 (θoutlet1,2010) 0.007 -0.016 0.044** 0.046** 0.014 -0.024
(0.012) (0.021) (0.011) (0.016) (0.021) (0.016)
2015×Outlet entry before 2006 (θoutlet1,2015) 0.001 -0.025 0.008 0.016 0.030 0.029
(0.011) (0.018) (0.012) (0.015) (0.022) (0.033)
2010×Outlet entry in 2006/10 (θoutlet2,2010) -0.017** -0.034 -0.015 -0.005 -0.002 0.007
(0.009) (0.022) (0.029) (0.028) (0.014) (0.018)
2015×Outlet entry in 2006/10 (θoutlet2,2015) 0.031* -0.027** -0.001 0.028 0.012 0.009
(0.014) (0.009) (0.020) (0.017) (0.012) (0.008)
2015×Outlet entry in 2010/15 (θoutlet3,2015) 0.003 -0.014 -0.018 -0.004 0.005 -0.007
(0.054) (0.031) (0.022) (0.017) (0.017) (0.021)
Pre-treatment trends:
2010×Supermarket entry in 2010/15 (θsuper3,2010) -0.022 -0.026 -0.027 -0.027 0.002 -0.038
(0.020) (0.022) (0.020) (0.017) (0.026) (0.030)
2010×Outlet entry in 2010/15 (θoutlet3,2010) -0.053* -0.017 -0.003 -0.000 -0.000 -0.012
(0.024) (0.021) (0.009) (0.008) (0.014) (0.006)
Observations 3,709 3,624 3,309 3,160 2,925 2,497
R2 0.910 0.911 0.912 0.913 0.918 0.921
NOTES: Estimates of θ based on the estimation of equation (1) among traditional pharmacies. Columns 1
to 4 take the main competitors of pharmacy i are its N nearest neighbors, with N = 1, 2, 4, 5, respectively.
Columns 5 and 6 consider all retailers located within a radius of 600 and 800 meters, respectively, as main
competitors. All specifications include year, drug, and pharmacy fixed-effects. Standard errors are shown in
parenthesis are clustered at the pharmacy and drug level. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table S4.12: Results from estimating equation (1) in PS-matched samples of pharmacies
using single neighbor matching
Number of nearest neighbors (N) Radius (R)
1 2 4 5 600m 800m
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DID estimates:
2010×Supermarket entry in 2006/10 (θsuper2,2010) -0.060*** -0.079*** -0.037* -0.048 -0.007 -0.045
(0.022) (0.025) (0.020) (0.041) (0.029) (0.030)
2015×Supermarket entry in 2006/10 (θsuper2,2015) -0.055*** -0.094*** -0.038 -0.048*** -0.027 -0.036
(0.020) (0.027) (0.025) (0.018) (0.024) (0.024)
2015×Supermarket entry in 2010/15 (θsuper3,2015) -0.029* -0.036*** -0.017 -0.032 -0.001 -0.039
(0.015) (0.008) (0.015) (0.020) (0.029) (0.028)
2010×Outlet entry in 2006/10 (θoutlet2,2010) -0.015** -0.020 0.029 -0.004 0.017 -0.003
(0.007) (0.021) (0.021) (0.027) (0.023) (0.022)
2015×Outlet entry in 2006/10 (θoutlet2,2015) 0.037** -0.025 0.011 0.025 0.025 0.016
(0.018) (0.020) (0.020) (0.022) (0.022) (0.024)
2015×Outlet entry in 2010/15 (θoutlet3,2015) 0.009 -0.012 -0.012 -0.005 0.004 -0.015
(0.062) (0.025) (0.022) (0.021) (0.025) (0.025)
Pre-treatment trends:
2010×Supermarket entry in 2010/15 (θsuper3,2010) -0.020 -0.011 0.017 -0.025 0.013 -0.051*
(0.018) (0.025) (0.020) (0.023) (0.030) (0.028)
2010×Outlet entry in 2010/15 (θoutlet3,2010) -0.050** -0.002 0.039*** 0.001 0.012 -0.029
(0.023) (0.014) (0.007) (0.021) (0.027) (0.021)
Observations 390 830 1,090 1,600 1,400 1,310
R2 0.916 0.905 0.903 0.913 0.905 0.933
NOTES: Estimates of θ based on the estimation of equation (1) on a matched sample of pharmacies, with
matching done on propensity scores using single nearest-neighbor matching. Columns 1 to 4 take the main
competitors of pharmacy i as its N nearest neighbors, with N = 1, 2, 4, 5, respectively. Columns 5 and 6
consider all retailers located within a radius of 600 and 800 meters, respectively, as main competitors.
All models include year, drug, and pharmacy fixed-effects. Standard errors shown in parenthesis are
bootstrapped using 30 repetitions, drawn cross-sectionally at the pharmacy level in the original sample.
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01.
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Table S4.13: Results from estimating equation (1) in PS-matched samples of pharmacies
using local linear regression
Number of nearest neighbors (N) Radius (R)
1 2 4 5 600m 800m
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DID estimates:
2010×Supermarket entry in 2006/10 (θsuper2,2010) -0.060 -0.074** -0.039 -0.034 -0.014 -0.047
(0.056) (0.037) (0.034) (0.041) (0.030) (0.031)
2015×Supermarket entry in 2006/10 (θsuper2,2015) -0.055 -0.092 -0.032 -0.040** -0.027 -0.044*
(0.067) (0.057) (0.037) (0.019) (0.025) (0.026)
2015×Supermarket entry in 2010/15 (θsuper3,2015) -0.029 -0.034 0.004 -0.024 -0.001 -0.047*
(0.065) (0.043) (0.033) (0.018) (0.026) (0.028)
2010×Outlet entry in 2006/10 (θoutlet2,2010) -0.015 -0.014 0.015 0.003 0.026 -0.006
(0.050) (0.053) (0.058) (0.026) (0.024) (0.023)
2015×Outlet entry in 2006/10 (θoutlet2,2015) 0.037 -0.024 0.012 0.034 0.030 0.009
(0.051) (0.041) (0.039) (0.021) (0.022) (0.024)
2015×Outlet entry in 2010/15 (θoutlet3,2015) 0.009 -0.010 -0.017 0.002 0.004 -0.022
(0.062) (0.051) (0.027) (0.021) (0.025) (0.025)
Pre-treatment trends:
2010×Supermarket entry in 2010/15 (θsuper3,2010) -0.020 -0.006 0.026 -0.011 0.013 -0.054*
(0.052) (0.046) (0.037) (0.024) (0.030) (0.028)
2010×Outlet entry in 2010/15 (θoutlet3,2010) -0.050 0.003 0.033 0.015 -0.012 -0.032
(0.052) (0.044) (0.029) (0.021) (0.028) (0.022)
Observations 390 830 1,030 1,560 1,390 1,580
R2 0.916 0.905 0.904 0.915 0.905 0.930
NOTES: Estimates of θ based on the estimation of equation (1) on a matched sample of pharmacies, with
matching done on propensity scores using local linear regression. Columns 1 to 4 take the main competitors of
pharmacy i as its N nearest neighbors, with N = 1, 2, 4, 5, respectively. Columns 5 and 5 consider all retailers
located within a radius of 600 and 800 meters, respectively, as main competitors. All models include year,
drug, and pharmacy fixed-effects. Standard errors shown in parenthesis are bootstrapped using 30 repetitions,
drawn cross-sectionally at the pharmacy level in the original sample. ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01.
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Table S4.14: Results from the estimation of the reduced-form entry model





























Pit−1 relatively to average market price -0.626 -1.242
(1.068) (1.034)
NOTES: Marginal effects of β1 from RE logit estimation of equation (2), with dependent variable being
an indicator for facing the entry of a supermarket (column 1) and an outlet (column 2). There are six
panels, each corresponding to an alternative definition of main competitors of pharmacy i. In the top four
panels, the main competitors of a pharmacy are its N nearest neighbors, with N=1,2,4,5, respectively.
In the two bottom panels, the main competitors of a pharmacy are the retailers located within a radius
of 600 and 800 meters, respectively. In each of the panels, the first row tests whether pharmacy i facing
the entry of a supermarket/outlet among its main competitors depends on the prices it charged in the
previous period, ζ(Pt−1) = Pit−1. The corresponding figures can be interpreted as the percentage-point
change in the probability of facing entry associated with a 1% higher OTC bundle price in the previous
period. The second row tests whether it depends on the lagged prices of pharmacy i relatively to
the average bundle price in the city of Lisbon. The corresponding figures can be interpreted as the
percentage-point change associated with a 1-unit increase in the independent variable. Recall that our
estimation sample differs according to how we define the set of main competitors of pharmacy i, so that
a different number of observations is used to obtain each marginal effect shown on the table. Standard
errors shown in parenthesis are clustered at the pharmacy level. ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01.
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S5 Additional Plots
Remark: In general, the plots do not suggest that supermarket or outlet entry
systematically took place near pharmacies in the highest price deciles or the
highest population deciles.
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(a) By current price deciles
(b) By past price deciles
Figure S5.1: Share of pharmacies facing non-pharmacy entry among their 3 nearest neighbors,
by price deciles
NOTES: In the top panel, pharmacies are grouped into deciles of their current price for the bundle of five
OTC drugs considered in our analysis. In the bottom panel, pharmacies are grouped into deciles of their
past price for the bundle of five OTC drugs considered in our analysis. In all the four plots the vertical axis
indicates the share of pharmacies in each decile who faced the entry of a supermarket or outlet among their
three nearest neighbors. We see that entry of supermarkets and outlets took place along all current and past
price deciles in both 2010 and 2015, with no clear pattern.
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Figure S5.2: Share of pharmacies facing entry of non-pharmacies among the 3 nearest
neighbors, by population deciles
NOTES: In order to create this figure, pharmacies are grouped into deciles of their 2001 level of demand, as
measured by the resident population in the Census tract where they are located. In all the four plots the
vertical axis indicates the share of pharmacies in each decile who faced the entry of a supermarket or outlet
among their three nearest neighbors. We again see that entry of supermarkets and outlets took place along
all population deciles in both 2010 and 2015, with no clear pattern.
59
(a) By current price deciles
(b) By past price deciles
Figure S5.3: Share of pharmacies facing non-pharmacy entry within a 400-meter radius, by
price deciles
NOTES: In the top panel, pharmacies are grouped into deciles of their current price for the bundle of five
OTC drugs considered in our analysis. In the bottom panel, pharmacies are grouped into deciles of their
past price for the bundle of five OTC drugs considered in our analysis. In all the four plots the vertical axis
indicates the share of pharmacies in each decile who faced the entry of a supermarket or outlet within a
400-meter radius. We see that entry of supermarkets and outlets took place along all current and past price
deciles in both 2010 and 2015, with no clear pattern.
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Figure S5.4: Share of pharmacies facing entry of non-pharmacies within a 400-meter radius,
by population deciles
NOTES: In order to create this figure, pharmacies are grouped into deciles of their 2001 level of demand,
as measured by the resident population in the Census tract where they are located. In all the four plots
the vertical axis indicates the share of pharmacies in each decile who faced the entry of a supermarket or
outlet within a 400-meter radius. We again see that entry of supermarkets and outlets took place along all
population deciles in both 2010 and 2015, with no clear pattern.
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(a) N = 3
(b) 400-meter radius
Figure S5.5: Plot assessing the plausibility of the common trend assumption
NOTES: The figures compare the evolution of the price of the bundle of 5 drugs in our analysis for three
distinct groups: the control group and the two groups of pharmacies who experienced entry of a supermarket
or outlet among their main competitors after 2010. In panel (a) main competitors are the 3 nearest neighbors
and in panel (b) they are all retailers located within a 400-meter radius. For groups treated after 2010 we
observe prices for two pre-treatment periods and can compare their evolution with the control group. Overall,
the plots do not suggest distinct price trends across the three groups between 2006 and 2010.
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S6 Details on the PSM-DID procedure
We use a propensity score matching difference-in-differences approach to address the possible
endogeneity of market structure (Heckman et al., 1997; Smith and Todd, 2005). The underlying
intuition for this approach is that by matching treated and untreated pharmacies on their
propensity score, that is, their probability of being treated, we make the groups more similar
in terms of the observables used in the estimation of the propensity score. Thus, treatment
should be random, conditional on the observables used to estimate the propensity score. The
crucial assumption we are making with the use of PSM-DID is that, by achieving balancing
on observables between the treated and control groups in the matched sample, it makes
it more likely that such balancing also extends to unobservables, particularly time-variant
unobservables (as time-invariant ones are in any case differenced out by the DID).
Below, we detail the more technical aspects regarding our implementation of PSM-DID.
Just like simple DID, PSM-DID yields estimates of the average treatment effect on the treated.
PSM is, however, a data-demanding method. Typical applications of PSM control for a large
set of observables in the estimation of the propensity score. While Heckman et al. (1997)
shows that models using a richer set of covariates to estimate the propensity scores tend to
be less biased, including more covariates also makes is more difficult to define the region of
common support (Gibson-Davis and Foster, 2006). There is little guidance on how to balance
this trade-off. As noted by Lechner (2010), one should include neither pre-treatment values
of the outcome variable nor post-treatment values of independent variables in the estimation
of the propensity score. With this in mind, and given that we do not have many variables
available to estimate propensity scores, we opted for matching on few variables.
Specifically, we match pharmacies on two measures. These measures are the level of competitive
pressure and the level of demand faced prior to experiencing non-pharmacy entry. Pre-
entry levels of competitive pressure are measured as of 2006, our first data period. In
the specifications using the N nearest neighbors as main competitors, pre-entry levels of
competitive pressure are captured by the average walking time (in minutes) to the N nearest
retailers in 2006. In the specifications using a radius distance to define the set of main
competitors of a pharmacy, the pre-entry level of competitive pressure is given by the number
of retailers within that radius in 2006. As for information of pre-entry levels of demand faced
by each pharmacy, we complement our dataset with information from Statistics Portugal on
the resident population in the Census tract where each pharmacy is located. This information
was collected in the 2001 Census of the population.
We categorize the two variables used to estimate the propensity score into quintiles and
we used the categorized variables for the matching. Given our unusual setting, featuring
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multiple time periods and multiple treatments, we proceed as follows. Using a logit model,
we estimate the propensity scores separately for each of the four treatment groups and for
each year of our data. Therefore, for each model specification, a total of 12(=4 treatments
×3 time periods) PSM procedures were carried out in order to obtain the matched sample of
pharmacies. Given the estimated propensity scores, we match each treated pharmacy to its
closest untreated PSM-neighbor at each time period (thus allowing us to easily accommodate
some exit that we see in the data). We use two alternative methods for matching treated and
untreated pharmacies. The first method is single nearest-neighbor within caliper matching
with replacement, setting the caliper at 0.02. The second method consists of non-parametric
local linear matching, with a bandwidth of 0.8.26 Finally, we run our model specifications in
this matched sample.
While asymptotically the estimates obtained should be independent of the matching method,
this is not the case in small samples. In particular, nearest neighbor estimates may be the
least biased, but are also less precise. Non-parametric methods, such as local linear regression,
in turn, may be more biased, but have higher precision (Gibson-Davis and Foster, 2006).
Therefore, if these two matched samples lead to similar price effects following the entry of
supermarkets and outlets in the OTC market, then we have more confidence that these effects
do not depend on the matching estimators used.
The standard errors of the estimates need to account for the propensity score estimation, the
imputation of the common support, the fact that we are matching with replacement, and
possibly also the order in which treated pharmacies are matched. A popular approach in this
setting is to use bootstrapping methods. We bootstrap the entire procedure, meaning that we
bootstrap pharmacies in the original sample, then carry out the estimation of the propensity
scores and the matching procedure for each treatment and for each year, and finally estimate
equation (1) in the matched sample for each of our bootstrapped samples.
We check covariate balancing between treatment and control groups in the original and
matched samples. For the sake of brevity, and since 12 PSM procedures are carried out for
each of the models we estimate, we do not show the results of covariate balancing tests or
graphs of the common support condition. These are available upon request from the authors.
In many, but nor all, of our PSM estimations we are able to achieve a decently balanced
sample in terms of the covariates, and we thus assume that balance was achieved also in terms
of unobservables.
Overall, the results of the PSM-DID are in line with those from the simple DID, though
statistical significance is often lost. This may be a result of the smaller estimation samples
used, as for each treated pharmacy we select only one matched untreated pharmacy.
26Different choices of caliper, number of neighbors matched, and bandwidth did not change our results.
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S7 Overview of pharmacy regulations during 2005-2015
Table S7.1: Overview of pharmacy regulations during the period 2005-2015
Month & year Legislation Measures
August 2005 Decree-Law 134/2005 OTC drugs become available outside pharmacies.
February 2007 Ordinance 30B/2007 6% administrative price reduction for Government reimbursed drugs; Reduces
margins for wholesalers and pharmacies.
March 2007 Decree-Law 60/2007 Introduces new rules for international price referencing to focus on low-price
countries; Regulated drug prices become maximum prices and not fixed
prices; Allows discounts at points of the value chain of pharmaceuticals in
the ambulatory market (wholesale and retail), and sets a margin at each
point.
June 2007 Decree-Law 238/2007 Enlarges the set of OTC drugs available outside pharmacies to include
those subject to Government reimbursement; Reimbursement conditional on
buying the drugs at a pharmacy.
August 2007 Decree-Law 307/2007 Liberalization of pharmacy ownership rules, with restrictions on the maxi-
mum number of pharmacies that can be owned by a single entity and on the
professional categories that can own a pharmacy (ie. doctors, pharmaceutical
companies, among others, cannot); Introduces exit restrictions (pharmacy
opening restrictions were already in place).
November 2007 Ordinance 1430/2007 Changes the geographic criteria for the opening of new pharmacies by
lowering number of inhabitants per pharmacy and the minimum distance
between pharmacies.
October 2010 Ordinance 104-A/2010 6% administrative price reduction for Government reimbursed drugs.
January 2012 Decree-Law 112/2011 Introduces a new margin scheme for prescription drugs: there were changes
in levels as well as the structure of the margins, with the introduction of a
regressive margin. Also sets the price cap for the first generic entering the
market to 50% of the price of the original drug.
May 2012 Ordinance 137-A/2012 Patients can substitute branded drugs for generics at the pharmacy; Pharma-
cies which must carry the 5 products with the lowest price in each reference
group.
January 2013 Ordinance n 14/2013 Introduces some flexibility in terms of the opening times of pharmacies
February 2013 Decree-Law 34/2013 Demands an annual revision of the set of countries use for reference pricing,
in order to ensure downward trend in prices.
February 2014 Decree-Law 19/2014 Further revises the margin scheme for pharmaceuticals by increasing the
fixed component and decreasing the proportional component.
NOTES: The table features the most important regulations affecting pharmacy profitability during the years
2005-2015 and it is not exhaustive.
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